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PA  Indigenous people (Peuple Autochtone) 
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PPE   Personal protective equipment 
RCCE  Risk communication and community engagement 
RECO  Community health workers (relais communautaire) 
SANRU  Rural Health Program (Projet Santé Rurale) 
SDB  Safe and dignified burial 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNICEF   United Nations Children’s Fund 
USAID   United States Agency for International Development 
WHO  World Health Organization 
WFP  World Food Programme  
                                                          
1 The original French terms are written in italics and in parentheses. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report is for supervisors managing ongoing Ebola outbreaks, or working on preparedness and 
recovery activities in regions at risk of, or affected by, Ebola epidemics. It is based on rapid and intensive 
ethnographic field research in Equateur Province, Democratic Republic of Congo, undertaken less than 
a month after the epidemic was declared over in July 2018. The research comprised 60 separate open-
ended, semi-structured interviews with local health workers, government officials and administrators, 
Ebola survivors and their families, community leaders, and national and international responders.  
The overall finding of the report is that an Ebola epidemic, along with the way the response itself is 
conducted, can have significant social, psychological, economic, and health impacts for the 
communities involved. By providing a close, qualitative reportage on perceptions of the epidemic and 
the response in Equateur Province, the report aims to render tangible the social, political and economic 
dimensions of an Ebola epidemic and to offer recommendations for the response which prepare 
communities for life ‘post-Ebola’ at each stage of an intervention.  
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic in 
order to minimize the health, social and economic impacts of the epidemic. Each section of the report 
examines one of these temporal stages. Part One: Preparedness provides information and 
recommendations on emergence, surveillance and health system capacity, vulnerable and marginalized 
populations, and the political and economic context of the 2018 Equateur outbreak. Part Two: Response 
provides information and recommendations on transmission, risk communication, contact tracing, 
vaccine deployment, case management, and burials. Part Three: Recovery provides information and 
recommendations on the economic, health (including mental health), and social repercussions of the 
epidemic and response. An index can be found at the end of the report to locate cross-cutting themes 
covered in multiple sections. 
The report provides recommendations relevant for supervisors working on risk communication, 
coordination, surveillance and contact tracing, infection prevention and control, case management, and 
safe & dignified burials (SDBs). Recommendations are divided into those that are operational (i.e. 
immediately applicable in the event of an outbreak) and those that are orientated toward long-term 
capacity building. Key recommendations are presented at the beginning of each section and are 
brought together in the overall conclusion.  
The report proposes a Grassroots Model for Epidemic Response, based on four key principles: (1) A 
‘whole society’ approach that attends not only to those individuals directly affected by the outbreak, 
but also to their broader communities; (2) a commitment to inclusivity appreciates that ‘communities’ 
are not homogenous, and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations; (3) 
an attention to local stakes that can help responders appreciate why Ebola epidemics are understood 
through the lens of broader issues such as politics, economics and religion; and finally, (4) a 
commitment to utilizing pre-existing epidemic response capacity in order to coordinate an effective 
response and ensures that interventions build on the social and cultural resources of the communities 
they seek to support. 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA 
 
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic. Each 
section of the report examines one of these temporal stages. During ‘preparedness’, the focus is on 
reducing vulnerability to disaster and strengthening capacity, surveillance and early detection. 
‘Response’ begins with a coordinated and rapid investigation, and then the implementation of 
appropriate control and case management, which is supported at each step and in every aspect by 
robust, clear and two-way communication. Finally, ‘recovery’ focuses on evaluation and accompanies 
affected communities in their lives ‘post-Ebola.’ Each stage should seek to minimise the health, social 
and economic impacts of the epidemic.  
 
  
PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
 
GRASSROOTS MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC RESPONSE 
 
(1) A ‘WHOLE SOCIETY’ APPROACH attends not only to those individuals directly  
affected by the outbreak, but also to their broader communities.  
 
(2) A COMMITMENT TO INCLUSIVITY appreciates that ‘communities’ are not 
homogenous  
and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations. 
 
(3) ATTENDING TO LOCAL PERSPECTIVES can help responders appreciate why Ebola 
epidemics  
are understood through alternative lenses and broader issues, such as politics,  
economics and religion.  
 
(4) UTILIZING PRE-EXISTING EPIDEMIC RESPONSE CAPACITY ensures that interventions 
build on  
the social and cultural resources of the communities they seek to support.  
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s ninth Ebola 
epidemic was declared on 8 May 2018 and was 
one of the most challenging outbreaks the 
country has had to face. It emerged 
simultaneously in two rural health zones, and 
quickly reached the provincial capital of 
Mbandaka, a city of more than 1.2 million 
inhabitants located on the banks of the Congo 
River and with regular movement along fluvial 
routes to and from the capital city, Kinshasa, 
which has over 12 million inhabitants.  
Following an epidemiological investigation, the 
Ministry of Public Health (MPH) and its 
international partners (including WHO, MSF, 
UNICEF, IFRC and ALIMA) rapidly deployed to the 
region, working with national and local partners.  
The outbreak was declared over on 24 July 
2018. There had been a total of 54 probable and 
confirmed cases and 33 deaths. The rapid 
deployment of the response, the active 
participation of the community and use of the 
rVSV-ZEBOV-GP trial vaccine were all credited 
with the rapid containment of the epidemic. 
Plans were laid out to continue supporting 
affected communities for 6 months following the 
end of the epidemic, in order to stimulate 
recovery and build resilience. However, on 1 
August 2018, a new outbreak was declared in 
Nord Kivu, and many resources were diverted to 
support the response efforts there. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 
UNICEF played an active role in the response, 
working on each of the 8 pillars: logistics; 
surveillance; vaccination; laboratory testing; 
prevention; case management; communication; 
psycho-social support.  
UNICEF C4D Risk Communication and Com-
munity Engagement (RCCE) teams were 
integrated into the other 7 pillars and were 
essential for their success. For example, as 
vaccination teams prepared for deployment, 
communication experts visited families and 
broader village communities or urban 
                                                          
2 Richards (2016). 
neighborhoods, to inform them of the event, 
what to expect, and to encourage their 
participation; communication experts were also 
embedded in surveillance teams, explaining Ebola 
symptoms and the principles of contact tracing, 
to assure cooperation;  as part of safe & dignified 
burial teams, communications teams established 
dialogue which could bridge stringent medical 
protocols and strong funerary traditions. 
Communities can play a significant role in 
containing Ebola when two-way communication is 
fostered with response workers and where 
epidemiologists provide timely and relevant 
advice to local actors. The resulting dialogue 
makes ‘communities think like epidemiologists, 
and epidemiologists …think like communities’.2 
Despite the ongoing outbreak in Nord Kivu, 
UNICEF is committed to continuing support for 
affected communities in Equateur. Furthermore, 
it is committed to spearheading an approach to 
Ebola responses which places an emphasis, both 
before and during each stage of the response, on 
preparing communities for life after the epidemic.   
Far less funding is available for recovery, 
resilience-building and preparedness after an 
outbreak than during an active epidemic. As such, 
many important questions remain unanswered:  
• What are the enduring social, economic and 
health impacts of an Ebola epidemic?  
• How do local health actors and community 
members themselves see the successes or 
challenges of the response?  
• What insights do they offer which could 
improve future response efforts?  
OBJECTIVES & SCOPE 
The overall objective of this report is to take a 
‘lessons learned’ approach to the epidemic in 
order to provide recommendations for best 
practice at each stage of an Ebola outbreak.  
An essential element of emergency 
management is evaluation. This report (using 
social science methods which act as an extension 
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of the two-way communication fostered by C4D 
teams during the response) has sought to develop 
recommendations in collaboration with the 
people of Equateur Province. 
By providing a close, qualitative reportage on 
perceptions of the epidemic and the response in 
Equateur Province, the report aims to render 
tangible the social, political and economic 
dimensions of an Ebola epidemic and to offer 
recommendations which ensure that 
interventions build on the social and cultural 
resources of the communities they seek to 
support – preparing them for life ‘post-Ebola’ at 
each stage of an intervention or response.  
It provides recommendations relevant for 
supervisors working on risk communication, 
coordination, surveillance and contact tracing, 
infection prevention and control, case 
management, and safe & dignified burials (SDBs).  
Recommendations are divided into those that 
are operational (i.e. immediately applicable in the 
event of an outbreak) and those that are 
orientated toward long-term capacity building. 
METHODOLOGY 
Employing rigorous data collection procedures, 
the author and a research assistant employed a 
qualitative approach to gather data both on the 
ground in Equateur Province (from 25 August 
until 11 September 2018) and through phone 
calls and meetings out of country. A thorough 
literature review of relevant policy pieces and 
grey literature was also undertaken. 
Interviews: A total of 87 people were interviewed 
during 60 separate open-ended, semi-structured 
interviews. Interviews typically lasted 45-90 
minutes and were conducted in French or Lingala 
as requested by the interviewee (without the use 
of an interpreter, as both the author and research 
assistant speak these languages fluently). 
Ethnographic approach: Informal conversations 
and exchanges were had with local community 
members and health workers and national or 
international responders, in order to have a wide 
range of popular and political speech, behaviors, 
events, reactions, and representations to analyze. 
                                                          
3 These numbers exceed the total number of people (87), by 3 
because 3 of the Twa participants were also local leaders or 
community health workers.. 
Participants: The aim was to speak with a broad 
cross-section of actors in both rural and urban 
communities. The map below indicates the 
villages in which interviews were undertaken (in 
all 5 affected health zones). Research participants 
can be categorized according to the following: 
- Local health officials and community health 
workers and committee members (RECO, CAC, 
CODESA): n=31 
- Ebola survivors and their families, as well as 
the families of victims: n=23 
- Marginalized populations (Twa): n=153 
- Local leaders (village chiefs, religious leaders, 
presidents of agricultural associations): n=8 
- International responders: n=8 
- Government officials and administrators: n=5 
 
 
 
Location: Ethnographic research was conducted 
in all 5 affected health zones: the health zones of 
Wangata, Mbandaka and Bolenge (in and around 
the provincial capital of Mbandaka), and the 
health zones of Bikoro and Iboko (Territory of 
Bikoro).  
Interviews and ethnographic research were 
conducted in the city of Mbandaka, the town of 
Bikoro, and the villages of Moheli, Ikoko 
Impenge, Nkuma, Itipo, Boyeka, Bobala and 
Iboko (see map overleaf). 
Research participants
Health Survivors Twa
Leaders Internat. Gov. officials
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Map showing GPS tracklog of research conducted in Equateur Province 25 Aug – 11 Sept 2018 
 
25KM  
GRASSROOTS MODEL FOR EPIDEMIC 
RESPONSE 
This report proposes a Grassroots Model for 
Epidemic Response., which has four key 
principles. The first is a ‘whole society’ approach 
that attends not only to those individuals directly 
affected by the outbreak, but also to their 
broader communities. Doing so can minimize 
fear, stigmatization and resentment, and help to 
rebuild social fabrics fragilized during the 
epidemic.  
The second is a commitment to inclusivity which 
appreciates that ‘communities’ are not 
homogenous and prioritizes the engagement of 
marginalized and vulnerable populations. This 
includes an attention to gender, to inter-
generational dynamics, to ethnic, religious or 
caste minorities, and to vulnerable populations 
such as widow(er)s, pregnant women, the infirm 
and the elderly.  
The third is that attention to local stakes can 
help responders appreciate why Ebola epidemics 
are understood through the lens of broader 
issues such as politics, economics and religion. 
Previously classed as ‘rumors’, these alternative 
explanations are often very revealing about 
perceptions of the state and health system, and 
about social tensions. Attending to these 
dynamics is of the utmost importance for a 
successful epidemic response.  
Finally, a commitment to utilizing pre-existing 
epidemic response capacity ensures that 
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interventions build on the social and cultural 
resources of the communities they seek to 
support. 
LIMITATIONS 
It is imperative that further research is conducted 
within the next year to monitor and evaluate the 
social, psychological and economic conditions of 
affected communities in Equateur Province, as 
this research provides only a snapshot.  
The sample (n.87) is not large enough to be 
generalizable, especially as there we found some 
differences in perceptions and experiences based 
on the location of the research. However, the 
themes which have been highlighted in this 
report are those which came up again and again, 
and also reflect issues raised by communities 
affected by the 2014 Ebola epidemic in nearby 
Boende. 4 
The nature of rapid research means that both 
the sample size and the depth of ethnographic 
research are limited. Traditional healers were not 
interviewed, because they were the focus of 
another C4D research mission. 
Furthermore, interviews with members of the 
national and international response were limited, 
as many of these actors were occupied with the 
ongoing outbreak in Nord Kivu and unavailable for 
interview for this report. The findings highlight 
several community perspectives and the 
recommendations are undoubtedly different 
than if they had resulted from interviews with 
responders.  
OUTLINE OF THE REPORT 
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to 
be done before, during and after an epidemic in 
order that the health and economic impacts are 
minimized. Each section of the report examines 
one of these temporal moments  
Part One: ‘Preparedness’ provides information 
and recommendations on emergence, 
surveillance and health system capacity, 
vulnerable populations, and the political and 
economic context of the 2018 Equateur outbreak. 
Part Two: ‘Response’ provides information and 
recommendations on transmission, risk 
communication, contact tracing, vaccine 
deployment, case management, and burials.  
Part Three: ‘Recovery’ provides information and 
recommendations on the economic, health 
(including mental health), and social 
repercussions of the epidemic and response.  
Each section begins with an infographic which 
summarizes the key recommendations. An index 
can be found at the end of the report to locate 
cross-cutting themes covered in multiple 
sections. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
4 Alcayna-Stevens & Giles-Vernick (forthcoming); Alcayna-
Stevens (forthcoming). 
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PART I | PREPAREDNESS 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: 
PREPAREDNESS 
 
Epidemic preparedness constitutes all the activities that must be undertaken at multiple levels (from the 
national to the health facility level) to be ready to respond effectively to an outbreak. Epidemic preparedness 
ensures that the routine surveillance system can detect an outbreak as soon as it occurs, and that staff are 
organized to confirm, investigate, and respond to an outbreak. Stocks of drugs and essential equipment, 
emergency finances, materials and supplies should also be maintained as part of epidemic preparedness. 
This section provides detail on the kinds of preparedness which would have facilitated an earlier detection 
of Ebola in the 2018 Equateur outbreak, as well as a more coordinated early response and a greater level of 
community engagement in the early stages of the outbreak. Outlined below are the key recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
Operational recommendation 
Utilize pre-existing capacity by seeking out local health, 
administrative and social science officials and experts 
when building response strategy. 
Capacity-building recommendation 
Pilot a variety of informal alert systems for 
churches, leaders, traditional health 
practitioners and community health workers to 
report concerns which have not yet been picked 
up by state health facilities. 
Capacity-building recommendation 
Train and deploy veterinarians in rural regions 
to monitor the health of wild and domestic 
animal populations.  
 
Capacity-building recommendation 
Encourage vulnerable and marginalized populations 
to trust and use the health system by setting up a 
special fund to subsidize their health care and 
establish long-term funding to train these 
populations as nurses, midwives and doctors.  
Operational recommendation 
Response teams should endeavor to employ women and other 
marginalized populations (e.g. community mobilization, contact 
tracing, psycho-social support, cooking for the response, selling 
agricultural produce, etc.). 
›› Pilot a variety informal communication and reporting systems for 
churches, leaders, traditional health practitioners and community 
health workers to report concerns which have not yet been picked 
up by state health facilities. 
 
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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1. PREPAREDNESS 
 
1.1 UNPACKING ‘COMMUNITY’ 
Response teams often refer to the local people with whom they work using the concept of ‘community.’ 
This may also be a salient concept for the people with whom they work themselves; for example, in Equateur 
Province, ordinary people often refer to themselves as part of ‘la communauté,’ using the French term. The 
term will be used throughout this report. However, it should always be used in a way which does not 
overlook the fact that rural villages and urban neighborhoods are made up of many different populations 
with different needs – some of which are more vulnerable than others. The following section therefore 
outlines the issues faced during an epidemic by some of the most marginalized and vulnerable populations. 
It provides recommendations for effective engagement of these populations. 
1.1.1 DEMOGRAPHY & CAPACITY 
The population of Equateur Province is 2,543,936. 
Half of the population live in the provincial capital 
of Mbandaka, located on the Congo River along 
an important trade route which connects to 
Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo 
and DRC’s capital, Kinshasa. The population of 
Mbandaka City is ethnically diverse, and more 
than 40 languages are spoken in and around 
Mbandaka.5 
Valuable information about the population, 
ethnicity, health and education structures and 
more can be found in the administrative and 
governmental ministries and departments. 
Despite this, some of the earliest reports 
produced by response teams contained errors 
and omissions in demographics and maps.6   
These errors were to do with the speed at which 
the initial contextual reports needed to be issued. 
However, they could have been avoided if local 
administrative and health authorities had been 
enlisted to help in their production.  
Response teams should coordinate with local 
government structures to access information 
about the socio-political and economic context, 
and work with local social scientists (such as those 
working at the universities and technical colleges 
of Mbandaka) to determine whether there are 
important ethnic or political conflicts in the region 
which could affect the response strategy. 
                                                          
5 Alcayna-Stevens & Bedford (2018). 
6 Yong (2018). 
7 Anoko & Falero (2018). 
8 The complex history of migration and inter-ethnic relations is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Cf.Hulstaert (1961); Vansina 
(1965); Pagezy (1975); Sulzmann (1986); Duda (2018). 
1.1.2 ETHNIC MINORITIES 
During the early stages of the Equateur outbreak, 
response teams expressed concern about 
‘resistance’ to the response from an ethnic group 
they referred to as ‘pygmies’ or ‘Twa’.7 Both of 
these terms can be used pejoratively or 
derogatorily and thus become offensive to such 
communities, depending on the context in which 
they are used. 
Response teams should always refer to people 
by the name they prefer. Using the term 
‘pygmies’ further stigmatizes and alienates 
vulnerable and marginalized populations.  
The term ‘PA’ or ‘peuples autochthones’ 
(indigenous people) should be used by response 
teams. These people often refer to themselves as 
‘Twa’.8 However, the term ‘PA’ was identified by 
people who participated in this research (both 
Twa and non-Twa) as the most respectful form of 
address for Twa people. This term may change or 
be disregarded in later years but should be used 
by response teams in the meantime as a sign of 
sensitivity and respect.9  
In this report, I use the term ‘Twa’ (pl. Batwa), 
which is more prominent in the literature. 
However, during all research interviews with both 
Twa and non-Twa, the term ‘PA’ was used. 
In terms of ethnic identity, both Twa and non-
Twa (called ‘Nkundo’ or ‘Bantu’ by Twa),10  
identify as members of either the Ntomba (to the 
9 The use of this politically-correct term is to denote respect and 
is not an indication of Twa ethnic identity. 
10 Both terms are confusing, as they denote a linguistic group 
(Bantu) of which Twa are a part, and an ethnic group (Nkundo) 
which is found further east. Cf. Duda & Alcayna-Stevens (2018). 
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west) or Ekonda (to the east) ethnic groups. They 
share the same language – either Lontomba or 
Lokonda.  
Rather than a separate ethnic group with a 
distinct language, it can be useful to think of 
Batwa as a distinct caste. Twa families have a 
relationship of interdependence with 
Nkundo/Bantu families, often providing hunted 
meat or agricultural labor for a Nkundo/Bantu 
family in exchange for money or agricultural 
produce and Twa villages are often found on the 
outskirts Bantu/Nkundo villages.11 
Batwa are often marginalized by Nkundo/Bantu; 
they are paid less for the same work, physically 
and sometimes verbally harassed or assaulted 
(with little legal recourse) and excluded from 
political activity and engagement. Bantu/Nkundo 
families may refer to themselves as the masters 
(nkolo in Lingala) of Twa lineages, and one young 
Twa woman described this relationship to us in 
terms of slavery and colonialism. In her words:  
When bushmeat was highlighted as the source of 
the Ebola (EVD) outbreak, some Batwa hunters 
told us they had experienced stigmatization. 
Furthermore, the emergence of EVD cases in 
Ikoko Impenge was initially connected by the 
families involved to a family land dispute, in which 
it was said that one family had sought the services 
of a powerful Twa healer, who had put a curse on 
the other family. The family of this man continues 
to be almost totally ostracized by the Nkundo 
villagers to this day.12 
One of the primary reasons Batwa gave for their 
initial resistance to the response was their 
suspicion that Ebola was a fabrication which 
Nkundo/Bantu would use to get rich, while killing 
or sterilizing Batwa. This led them to resist tests, 
vaccinations, treatment at biomedical facilities 
and Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs), and secure 
burials. They also found free health care 
suspicious and initially refused to attend health 
centers and posts.  
Due to a combination of poverty, to the fact that 
there are few health posts in all-Twa villages, to 
discrimination experienced at biomedical 
                                                          
11 Duda & Alcayna-Stevens (2018); see also Samndong (2016). 
12 Ingrid Gercama (pers. comm. 2018) 
13 Duda (2018) 
facilities, and to their own skills in traditional 
healing, Twa communities typically have little 
faith in biomedicine. 
A further barrier to their engagement was the 
fact that many community health actors are 
Nkundo/Bantu. Nkundo/Bantu – often more 
educated and more comfortable in expressing 
themselves to foreigners – became mediators in 
response teams’ interactions with Twa 
communities, and this made them distrustful and 
resentful that they were not being directly 
engaged by the response.  
Speaking retrospectively about the epidemic, 
many Batwa appeared resentful of the fact that 
few of them had been directly involved in the 
response’s activities. Other reports by social 
scientists suggest that they were often engaged 
for unpaid services.13 Even those who had been 
involved as community health workers (RECO), 
reported being underpaid compared with 
Nkundo/Bantu counterparts. Some families of 
victims also reported not receiving the psycho-
social support and food provisions that bereaved 
Nkundo/Bantu families received. 
Response teams were not always sympathetic 
to these feelings of exclusions, with some 
responders explaining that Batwa do not ‘put 
themselves forward’ or that they do not ‘plan 
ahead’. The egalitarian nature of Twa societies, 
which often lack stable customary chiefs, can 
make it more difficult for response teams to 
immediately identify clear community leadership 
and representation.  
Even when they were employed by response 
teams, there were challenges. One international 
doctor explained that he had employed a Twa 
man as a security guard, but that the man was 
physically attacked when he tried to stop a 
Nkundo/Bantu man from entering the 
compound; the man said, ‘a Twa has no right to 
restrict my movement.’ 
Operational recommendation14 
›› No community actor should be asked to work 
without appropriate payment and all people 
should be remunerated at the same rate, with 
direct payment, rather than the use of 
intermediaries. 
14 Further, detailed recommendations on working with 
marginalized Twa communities can be found in Duda & Alcayna-
Stevens (2018). 
“They colonise and enslave us” 
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Capacity-building recommendation 
›› Support the Ministry of Public Health to 
reinforce trust in biomedical services by 
establishing a special fund to subsidize healthcare 
for Batwa and long-term funding to train Twa 
nurses, midwives and doctors. 
1.1.3 GENDER 
In general, women are more emancipated in 
Mbandaka City than in the villages (i.e. more likely 
to pursue an education or own small businesses). 
Still, very few women hold government positions. 
The majority are engaged in commerce (most 
market sellers are women) and unpaid domestic 
labor. In rural areas several women’s agricultural 
associations exist, where women take turns 
working in each other’s fields. 
Women are often important decision makers in 
the domestic sphere. Whether or not they control 
part of the household’s finances varies between 
families. However, they are always important 
actors in ensuring family health and hygiene and 
in educating children about sanitation, health and 
disease. Their influence should never be 
overlooked during an epidemic response. One 
woman, a leader of women’s associations in Itipo, 
quoted the famous saying, as she explained to me 
the significant role women play in rural Congo:  
Women are also at higher risk of catching Ebola 
(EVD) – not due to any biological reason, but 
because of their social duties.15 They are often 
the ones who butcher meat when preparing 
meals for the family, or when selling bushmeat at 
market (most vendors of meat and agricultural 
produce are women). They are also caregivers to 
the sick and must wash the bodies of deceased 
female relatives. Pregnant women have been 
found to be more susceptible to EVD because of 
their lowered immune systems, and yet they are 
not eligible to be vaccinated.16 
Widows are often particularly vulnerable 
members of the community, and likely to be 
excluded from social and political process. 
Without their husband, they can face ostracism in 
their marital village – this is often particularly 
                                                          
15 Menendes et al (2015). 
acute if their children have already grown and left 
or if they have no children. Ebola widows face 
particular challenges. For example, during the 
mourning period following their husband’s death, 
widows must grieve and cannot leave the house 
or even stand up to wash or feed themselves for 
several days. Widows who participated in the 
research in both rural and urban areas said this 
meant that they had not been able to attend the 
vaccination campaign for contacts. Furthermore, 
widows often struggle to provide for their families 
without their husband’s income, and may even 
find themselves with debts left by their husbands. 
See also, 3.1.4 Debt and funerary costs. 
Women are seldom as influential in the public 
sphere as in the private sphere, as most ethnic 
groups in Equateur practice patrilocal residence 
and women therefore lack family support 
networks in their marital villages. This can lead to 
them being overlooked by response teams both 
in terms of community engagement and in terms 
of employment opportunities in the response.  
Several influential women (including the 
president and secretary of the women’s 
associations of Itipo and the head of the women 
and families service in Bikoro) participated in the 
research. These women felt that there had not 
always been sufficient engagement of local 
women in the response. They pointed to an 
absence of workshops and education sessions 
targeted specifically at women, and to the fact 
that many education materials were 
communicated in French or Lingala, and 
therefore not always accessible to women, who 
often have lower levels of education and literacy. 
This was also an issue with the vaccine consent 
forms, which were often written in French.  
To engage women effectively, sessions should 
be held in their natal language, and in a setting in 
which they feel comfortable seeking 
clarifications, which is not always the case in 
mixed-gender meetings. 
Several women (many of them teachers) were 
trained as psycho-social assistants by UNICEF 
partners and were invaluable in efforts to combat 
stigma and reintegrate survivors and families of 
victims.  
 
16 Bebell et al (2017). 
“If you educate a woman, you 
educate a whole nation” 
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Operational recommendations 
›› Response teams should collaborate with local 
women’s associations in order to provide 
information sessions for women on health, 
hygiene and risk management, with special 
information sessions held for pregnant and 
lactating women to inform them about risk and to 
explain to them why they are excluded from the 
vaccine campaign.  
›› Response teams should endeavor to employ 
women in various domains (e.g. community 
mobilization, contact tracing, psycho-social 
support, cooking for the response, selling 
agricultural produce, etc.). 
1.1.4 YOUTH 
The DRC has a markedly young population, with 
around 42% of the population under the age of 15 
years, and 62% under the age of 25 years.  
At the beginning of the Equateur outbreak, 
many parents removed their children from 
school, fearing that they might be exposed to 
infected individuals. This was detrimental both to 
community engagement and to the children’s 
education. Once they started attending classes 
again, children were provided with education on 
hand-washing and learned about the disease – 
they were able to cascade learning to their 
families. 
School teachers should be provided with basic 
psychosocial skills to support their pupils, and 
school should be used to engage children using 
appropriate participatory methods to teach them 
about the disease, how to protect themselves, 
and about treatment and vaccination.  
Foreign actors and increased economic activity 
are seen by young people (particularly young 
men) as opportunities to find employment and 
piecemeal work. Many will look for opportunities 
to work for or alongside response teams (helping 
with logistics or manual work).  
It is important to note, however, that, as new 
employment opportunities for youth have led to 
greater financial emancipation from their elders, 
traditional leadership structures have been 
increasingly challenged, and inter-generational 
tensions may result in challenges for participatory 
decision-making (e.g. if elders reject the presence 
of foreigners whilst youth welcome them in the 
hope of employment opportunities). 
Operational recommendation 
›› The response should positively harness youth 
groups and other associations to support and 
contribute to community mobilization, contact 
tracing, safe and dignified burials, and to help with 
logistics including clearing roads. Collaboration can 
be established with existing youth groups and 
associations. 
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1.2 POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The following section summarizes the political and economic context of Equateur Province. It examines the 
structures of governance which must be respected by response teams and provides recommendations on 
how to remain politically neutral. It also examines the economic activities (subsistence farming, bushmeat 
hunting and trade etc.) which can be perturbed by a large-scale economic response, and the economic 
conditions of poverty which can lead communities at large to view an Ebola outbreak less as an issue of 
public health and more as an issue of wealth and inequality.  
1.2.1 GOVERNANCE AND POLITICS 
The DRC is divided into 26 provinces, each 
governed by a provincial government led by a 
Governor, Vice Governor, and Provincial 
Ministers (e.g. of agriculture). Each province is 
subdivided into territories and sectors. The 
highest administrative authority at the territory 
level is the territorial administrator (AT). Within a 
territory, each sector is governed by a sector chief 
(Chef de Secteur).  
Rural areas have a parallel governance structure 
of both state and customary political leadership. 
Within each sector are several ‘groupements’, 
governed by a Chef de Groupement who is also a 
customary leader and can deal with both legal 
and customary matters at the groupement level. 
Within each groupement there are villages, each 
of which has a Chef de Village who is elected by 
the village to serve as the representative of the 
state for the village for several years, and several 
village elders (the heads of each family). 
Other influential local elites include religious 
leaders, local civil society actors and the 
presidents of farming, youth, church and 
women’s associations. Several of the people who 
participated in the research felt that there was 
too much of an emphasis on engaging health 
actors, and that local leaders, particularly in 
smaller villages, had not been sufficiently 
engaged. This was particular true of Twa leaders. 
Complex and cumbersome bureaucratic 
processes, many of which originate in the colonial 
period, mean that offense can be taken if 
influential local leaders, especially those in charge 
of the structures a response team is attempting 
to access, are not saluted, informed and engaged 
from the outset.  
Corruption, nepotism and embezzlement are 
part of the survival strategies of those in positions 
of power in DRC. Particularly in rural areas, 
salaries are often unpaid for lengthy periods, and 
people capitalize on the access and benefits they 
can acquire from their position in order to survive. 
These practices have led to an erosion of trust, 
and many ordinary Congolese are suspicious and 
distrustful of the structures through which 
response teams may attempt to access them. 
Even at a more local level, inadequate 
accountability mechanisms mean that elites may 
monopolize political leadership and benefit from 
resources meant for community-based 
organizations. 
Both governing and opposition parties often try 
to politicize an epidemic (and the resources it 
brings to the country), and response teams must 
therefore strive for political neutrality. A social 
scientist could accompany response teams in 
order to determine local populations’ levels of 
trust towards official structures and to monitor 
the ways in which politicians may vie to politicize 
the epidemic in their favor.  
Co-ordination is essential, and response teams 
should build on pre-existing response capacity 
and work through local officials and partners to 
ensure that interventions build on the social and 
cultural resources of the communities they seek 
to support. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Response teams should designate a member of 
the logistics or coordination team to fulfil all of the 
formalities required in order to be approved by the 
relevant government, customary and community 
authorities. However, responders should also aim 
to have relatively unmediated contact with 
community members once these civilities have 
been fulfilled. 
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1.2.2 INFRASTRUCTURE AND MOBILITY 
There is a lack of basic infrastructure across 
Equateur Province including electricity and 
running water.17 The province has a road 
network, but it is in poor condition and only 43 km 
of it is paved. There are no railways and long-
distance travel within the province relies on the 
river and other waterways. Many areas (e.g. the 
Ikoko Impenge health area) can only be reached 
by motorbike or foot. People travel primarily on 
foot or by bicycle (sometimes up to 500km), or by 
dugout canoe along tributaries and rivers. 
These logistical challenges not only impact 
response operations but must be taken into 
consideration when asking communities in more 
remote villages and forest camps to seek 
treatment, show up for vaccination campaigns or 
conduct safe burials.  
During the epidemic, the World Food 
Programme (WFP) set up a helicopter, which 
would sometimes undertake 6 flights per day to 
bring supplies from Mbandaka to Bikoro, Itipo and 
Iboko. Some of the health and administrative 
officials who participated in this research, 
lamented the inefficiency of this method, as the 
helicopter could not transport much weight. 
Many communities wished that the response 
team had invested in rehabilitating road 
infrastructure – an investment which would 
continue to serve them today.  
Local people, especially youth groups, could 
also have benefitted from the income they would 
have made from path clearing and road 
rehabilitation. At the beginning of the Equateur 
epidemic, groups of young men protested in 
order to petition for jobs. This was also 
documented in Nord Kivu.18 
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› Positively harnessing youth groups to help with 
logistics including clearing roads and building 
bridges during the epidemic, would provide the 
infrastructure necessary to strengthen future 
preparedness.  
1.2.3 SUBSISTENCE AND ECONOMY 
The majority of the population relies on 
agriculture for subsistence and cash crops.19 
People also hunt, fish and gather medicinal and 
edible plants from the forest, as well as wood for 
the production of charcoal. In and around the 
urban centers or larger rural centers, many 
people are involved in trade and commerce, some 
of which centers on the bushmeat trade. See also, 
1.3.4 Consumption of game meat. 
Poverty is systemic and entrenched in many 
parts of rural DRC. The average household lives on 
less than $1 per day. People struggle to find the 
money to pay for health care and school fees to 
send their children to school. Subsistence farming 
is hard, and many people suffer from health 
conditions, such as hernias and back problems, 
related to the work they do in the fields or when 
carrying water or firewood. According to the 
WHO, in 2015, over 22.3% of deaths of women of 
reproductive age were associated with 
childbirth.20 Infant mortality is high (nearly 1/10 
live births),21 and malnutrition is estimated to 
threaten the lives of 2 million children.22  
Crops harvests can fail, and domestic animals 
can be wiped out during epidemics. Many hunters 
report seeing fewer and fewer wild animals in the 
forest since the bushmeat trade intensified 
following the civil wars. This means that many 
people are hungry and undernourished. Beyond 
these issues related to rural poverty, DRC is facing 
an economic crisis on a national scale and the cost 
of living is becoming unmanageable for many 
households. 
Understanding the implications of rural poverty 
in Equateur Province can help responders 
understand why Ebola epidemics (and the 
resources they bring) are often seen as an issue 
about wealth more than health. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
17 Alcayna-Stevens & Bedford (2018) 
18 Oldenburg (2018). 
19 Alcayna-Stevens & Bedford (2018) 
20 WHO (2015). 
21 World Bank (2017). 
22 UNICEF (2015). 
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1.3 HEALTH, SANITATION AND RISK 
The following section summarizes the health context of Equateur Province. It examines the factors which 
exacerbated the outbreak or led to challenges in the detection and control of the epidemic. It also examines 
the strengths of DRC’s community health networks, which mitigated the epidemic and should be harnessed 
during any outbreak to ensure that interventions build on the social and cultural resources of the 
communities they seek to support.  
1.3.1 HEALTH SYSTEM & SURVEILLANCE 
The province of Equateur has 284 health centers 
and 18 hospitals for a population of over 2.5 
million people. Rural communities may live up to 
15km from the nearest health post and 30km 
from the nearest health center.  
There are few qualified doctors in rural areas, 
and almost all services at health centers and 
health posts are provided by nurses, midwives 
and auxiliary health workers, some of whom have 
never received formal training. Even those with 
formal training are not necessarily trained to spot 
diseases of epidemic potential. Nurses who 
participated in the research at the epicenter of 
the epidemic (Ikoko Impenge and Itipo) 
emphasized that they had never heard of Ebola 
prior to the outbreak and had no idea of the risks 
of contagion when they began treating the first 
cases. 
 A doctor at Bolenge hospital in Mbandaka also 
suggested that after the epidemic had been 
declared, some nurses continued to find 
identifying suspected cases difficult. This is in part 
because the early symptoms of EVD are similar to 
some of the most common diseases found in the 
region, such as malaria and bacterial or parasitic 
infection of the digestive system: high fever, 
headache, weakness, muscle pain, nausea, 
vomiting, diarrhea, weakness. The nurses we 
encountered in Mbandaka city who had felt more 
confident in identifying cases were those who had 
received some training during the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak in the Boende region, 450km away. 
Even when nurses were concerned by patients’ 
symptoms, they lacked the necessary protective 
equipment to treat suspected cases of EVD. 
Normally, health centers and health posts receive 
supplies from international bodies via the general 
hospital, but they experience frequent shortages 
and are often almost devoid of medicines, 
equipment and other materials. They often have 
limited infection prevention control mechanisms, 
poor sanitation and hygiene, and electricity 
shortages. People often travel great distances to 
seek adequate healthcare, if they are able, and 
this increases the spread of an epidemic. 
Many doctors and nurses who participated in 
the research in both rural and urban areas 
emphasized the difference which could be made 
in early treatment of cases if they had isolation 
wards, personal protective equipment (PPE), 
decontamination materials and incinerators.  
They also suggested an immediately accessible 
epidemic fund. The head of the provisional health 
division (DPS) told us that provincial epidemic 
investigation teams often lack the food, fuel and 
on-hand cash necessary for investigations of 
suspicious cases in rural areas. This can delay the 
alert which would lead to an investigation by 
competent and experienced INRB epidemiology 
teams, and thus the declaration of an epidemic. 
There are two further factors which can lead to 
delays in national epidemic investigations: (1) 
many health posts are supported by the church 
(either Protestant or Catholic) rather than the 
state, and alerts at the local level are not always 
taken into consideration by the health zone 
hospital. This is what happened in Boyeka village 
in early 2018, which many local people still 
believe was the origin of the Ebola epidemic; (2) 
People often seek treatment from many different 
sources, and epidemics may take some time to 
become visible to biomedical health practitioners. 
The greatest strength in the Congolese health 
system is the capacity and commitment of 
community health workers (RECO), community 
outreach units (CAC) and local health committees 
(CODESA) – See also: 2.1.3 Community health 
workers. As several of the local health actors 
interviewed for this research emphasized:  
In order to be effective, response teams must 
utilize these existing local health structures and 
actors. 
 
“Epidemics are nothing new” 
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Capacity-building recommendation 
›› Pilot a variety informal communication and 
reporting systems for churches, leaders, 
traditional health practitioners and community 
health workers to report concerns which have not 
yet been picked up by state health facilities. 
1.3.2 SANITATION 
Almost no households in Equateur Province have 
access to running water and many rural 
communities struggle to access safe drinking 
water. Following the epidemic, in September 
2018, some villages, such as Moheli, were still 
receiving drinking water from Oxfam. Many 
people suffer from chronic parasites and bacterial 
infections as a result of poor quality drinking 
water. 
Many households also lack adequate pit 
latrines. Although most people sweep and tidy 
their yards once or twice per day, domestic 
animals and small children often defecate nearby 
during the day, and open-air waste pits are 
located near houses. While people typically bathe 
once per day at the nearest river or stream, few 
people have a habit of washing their hands before 
eating. Both of these factors exacerbate the 
transmission of disease. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Children should be encouraged to wash their 
hands after defecation and before eating when at 
school and health actors should encourage hand-
washing, especially to mothers visiting for routine 
check-ups or vaccinations.  
›› People can be encouraged to wash with soap 
made from ashes, which is affordable and readily 
available, and projects could be develop to 
stimulate local soap-making, through which 
women could also supplement their income. 
1.3.3 HEALTH-SEEKING PRACTICES 
Care-seeking practices are not static but shift and 
evolve in response to immediate conditions.23 
Communities are pragmatic and try multiple 
courses of action in an effort to effect a cure, 
seeking out different types of care either 
consecutively or in parallel (including 
biomedicine, prayer, self-medication and 
                                                          
23 Alcayna-Stevens & Bedford (2018) 
consulting traditional healers). See also, 2.1.5 
Alternative explanations. 
Whilst rural Congolese are frequently described 
as seeking alternative care over biomedical 
treatment, this is often the result of structural 
barriers that prevent access to biomedical 
services, including direct and indirect costs 
associated with consultations and treatment; 
distance from home to point of service, lack of 
services (e.g. drug stockouts), or discrimination. 
These factors are also very important in 
understanding why patients may choose one 
health facility over another (for example, while 
the first cases of EVD were from the health zone 
Strengthening health & sanitation systems 
›› Training materials should be developed on 
detection of epidemic diseases and case 
monitoring, to be integrated into the training 
nurses receive – particularly nurses working in 
rural, forested areas. 
›› Efforts should be made to expand the SANRU 
Rural Health Program (Projet Santé Rurale) which 
works to improve the quality of and access to 
primary health care and provides free malaria 
prevention and treatment projects – and to 
develop similar projects for diarrheal disease. 
›› Hospitals should have a readily-accessible 
epidemic fund, which can be used in emergency 
contexts and to investigate suspicious cases of 
epidemic proportion. 
›› Health centers should be stocked with kits 
containing chlorine and EP for suspicious cases and 
the protection of health actors, as well as 
incinerators for hazardous biological waste.1  
›› Isolation wards should be built into all health 
centers to aid investigation of suspicious cases. 
›› Efforts should be made to ensure access to safe 
drinking water (wells, natural springs) in all rural 
villages in DRC in collaboration with the national 
school and village sanitation programme (Ecole et 
Village Assainis). 
›› All households should have one well-maintained 
pit latrine made from affordable, locally-available 
materials. 
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of Bikoro – Ikoko Impenge village – most had 
travelled for treatment to nearby Itipo, in the 
health zone of Iboko, rather than the general 
hospital of Bikoro, which is where they had been 
referred but which was much further away. 
Traditional medicine includes medicinal herbs 
and massage (to treat broken bones and 
fractures). Some of these treatments can be 
effective in treating certain illnesses, although 
they can also be dangerous, as dosage can be 
difficult to estimate, and herbal remedies can be 
fatal when taken along with biomedical drugs 
(sometimes expired or of poor quality) bought 
from pharmacies, markets and informal drug 
vendors. During the Ebola epidemic, certain 
communities have attributed the fact that they 
never became sick to the fact that they took 
herbal prophylaxis throughout the epidemic.  
Caring for sick relatives is very important in 
Equateur. When a person becomes an in-patient 
s/he is accompanied by their family members, 
who feed and care for them. Both the sick and 
deceased must be washed by their relatives. This 
is a deeply emotional and cultural practices which 
cannot be dismissed. However, it does render 
people susceptible to infection. When preparing 
the body of a deceased relative for burial, for 
example, people clean not only the outside of the 
body, but its cavities, which greatly increases their 
chances of coming into contact with infected 
body fluids. This is especially risky with cases of 
EVD, which is most contagious after death. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Traditional healing should not be dismissed. 
Training should be offered to traditional healers 
and religious leaders about safety, sanitation and 
how to spot diseases of epidemic potential which 
may go beyond the care they can offer.  
1.3.4 CONSUMPTION OF GAME MEAT 
Experts have still not identified the reservoir 
species for Ebola, and while they have very strong 
hypotheses about how ‘zoonotic spillovers’ into 
human populations occur,24 they do not yet have 
firm evidence. With their knowledge of forest 
animals and ecosystems, rural people who use 
the forest daily can be valuable sources of 
                                                          
24 Leroy et al (2009). 
25 Duda (2018). 
information about the emergence of such 
zoonotic diseases. 
Game meat is a valued source of protein 
throughout the province. It is a source of 
subsistence or income, as local hunters either 
consume it with their households/extended 
families or sell it on a local or regional scale. These 
two factors, and the fact that most of the time 
that people eat game meat, they do not become 
sick, leads many to be resistant to the idea that it 
could be a source of Ebola. 
Messages which prohibit or stigmatize the 
eating or selling of game meat can be harmful to 
people’s health and income, because they may 
end up reducing their protein intake and unable 
to make money selling meat – they may have no 
alternative source of income. This is one of the 
reasons that some people demand work from 
response teams as ‘compensation.’ 
Demonizing bushmeat can also have the effect 
of stigmatizing hunters, many of whom are from 
Twa communities and already marginalized and 
suffering from extreme poverty. See also, 1.3.1 
Ethnic minorities. 
During the epidemic, the Health Minister, Oly 
Ilunga, emphasized that bushmeat hunting, trade 
and consumption were not prohibited, but that 
people were strongly discouraged from eating 
animals found dead or dying in the forest. While 
Dr Ilunga’s statements were clear, some of the 
information and training workshops nonetheless 
suggested an outright ban on bushmeat 
consumption, and even dissuaded people from 
eating forest fruits.25 
Operational recommendation 
›› As in previous outbreaks, a total ban on wildlife 
consumption is often counterproductive, raises 
suspicions and is likely to be rejected by the local 
population.26 The message should be about 
animals found dead or dying in the forest. 
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› Veterinarians and epidemiologists specializing in 
zoonotic disease and a ‘One Health’ approach 
should be deployed in rural regions to monitor the 
health of wild and domestic animal populations.
26 Bonwitt et al (2018). 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: 
RESPONSE 
 
An effective epidemic response requires coordination on the part of epidemiologists, clinicians, 
logisticians and communications experts. Epidemiologists are involved in outbreak investigation, 
surveillance and contact tracing. Clinicians are involved in vaccination, case management, and in the 
management of safe and dignified burials. Communications experts are integrated into the other pillars 
and facilitate two-way communication between responders and communities. The technical teams 
must be supported by local political, administrative and public health authorities, which make decisions 
on infrastructure, regulations, vaccinations, and so on, based on advice from the coordinating team. 
The coordinating team is made up of representatives from the technical subgroups, logistics and 
administrative personnel, and headed by the representative of the Ministry of Public Health. This 
section of the report provides detail on areas of the response which could have been more coordinated 
and effective during the 2018 Equateur outbreak. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESPONSE
RECOVERY
PREPAREDNESS
Operational recommendation 
Work with local artists and social scientists to develop culturally 
appropriate communications material and engage communities 
in the planning of response activities. 
Operational recommendation 
The initial epidemiological investigation should 
determine the epicenter of the epidemic, and 
treatment centers should be set up as close to that 
epicenter as possible to minimize the distance patients 
need to travel from their families for treatment. 
Furthermore, families should be kept informed and 
involved at all stages of treatment. 
 
Operational recommendation 
Vaccine information should be given to whole 
communities, so that they can understand who is 
considered at risk and thus eligible, and why the vaccine 
is recommended for certain individuals and not others. 
Operational recommendation 
Work with health officials to select community health 
workers at the outset of the epidemic, and provide them 
with the technical and logistical support that will facilitate 
their coordination and supervision duties. 
Operational recommendation 
Vaccine teams should go to the homes of 
close contacts who cannot travel to health 
centers.  
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
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2. RESPONSE 
 
2.1 RISK COMMUNICATION AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
The following section summarizes the communication and community engagement work which is the most 
important aspect of any epidemic response: without the support and participation of the community, 
responses are doomed to failure. UNICEF is committed to recruiting local mobilisers, thereby enabling the 
response to have access to local knowledge and a deep understanding of the context. Two-way 
communication is essential to the establishment of trust and to finding effective solutions. It is particularly 
important because people’s attitudes and priorities shift as a product of their relationship with the disease 
and the response itself. 27 Communication media should therefore be constantly rethought and redesigned. 
2.1.1 COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 
Community engagement (CE) is the stimulation of 
community dialogue platforms (urban, rural, 
media, other) and is a process not an event.  CE 
aims to support community leaders and assure 
that decisions are made with a participatory 
approach where voices of women, youth and the 
marginalized are heard.  
The objective of community engagement 
activities is to reach as many people as possible. 
In Mbandaka, workshops were organized for 
health actors, and taxi and bicycle chauffeurs. 
These efforts are to be commended. The bicycle 
and taxi chauffeurs were able to reach a wide 
cross-section of the population. However, we 
identified three other groups which could have 
benefitted from engagement and risk education: 
religious leaders, customary leaders (see also 
2.1.4: Local leaders) and women’s associations 
(see also 1.1.3: Gender). 
Community engagement activities should be 
made as participatory as possible. This means that 
they should be presented in a language which can 
be understood be all participants, that people 
should have numerous opportunities to choose 
groups within which they feel comfortable 
participating, e.g. some activities aimed 
particularly at ethnic minorities or women. 
When people feel that they lack information 
and decision-making power frustrations can 
quickly develop. Communities should be engaged 
in the planning of response activities and 
consulted as these activities develop and change. 
As well as fostering active participation, this 
                                                          
27 Ripoll et al (2018). 
28 Abramowitz et al (2017). 
29 Bedford (2018a). 
practice can provide the response with 
operationally useful information. 
Different modes of community engagement 
that tap into a variety of local platforms should be 
employed strategically and should be evaluated 
so that limited resources can be channeled to 
have the greatest impact, while targeting a range 
of different groups: e.g. health workers, women’s 
associations, taxi and bicycle drivers, customs 
agents, religious leaders, customary leaders, etc.  
2.1.2 COMMUNICATING RISK 
Risk communication refers to the exchange of life-
saving information during times of threat and 
danger. When confronted with accelerating 
community deaths, people are more likely to 
incorporate health information, provided they 
acquire it through local networks.28 UNICEF 
therefore trains community health workers and 
local leaders in risk communication. 
Action-based workshops that use ‘edutainment’ 
methods and role-play have been reported to be 
well received with attendees displaying a higher-
level of sustained engagement.29 Rather than 
simply repeating basic messages and offering 
instructions, explanations must be offered about 
the rationale behind the behaviors (e.g. hand-
washing, SDB) being proposed. 
It is important to be aware that people will often 
expect compensation for the time they take to 
attend activities and workshops, in the form of 
food on the day, and money ‘for transport’. 
During the outbreak, tensions erupted when it 
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was discovered that the response was paying the 
owners of taxi motorcycles and not the taximen 
themselves for their risk communication 
activities.30 Participants of community 
engagement activities and those undertaking 
RCCE should be fairly paid or compensated – 
research should be conducted to make sure that 
it is those conducting the work, and not 
mediators who are paid for this activity. 
Meaningful community dialogue which 
facilitates the two-way exchange of information 
should be encouraged. Different modes of 
community engagement that tap into a variety of 
local platforms should be employed strategically 
and should be evaluated so that limited resources 
can be channeled to have the greatest impact, 
while targeting a range of different groups: e.g. 
health workers, women’s associations, taxi and 
bicycle drivers, customs agents, religious leaders, 
customary leaders, etc. 
                                                          
30 More detail on the risk communication activities of taxi 
motorcycles can be found in Kemba (2018). 
Operational recommendation 
›› Communication teams should inform different 
populations about all aspects of the response, so 
that certain elements (e.g. SDBs, vaccination, 
ETCs) don’t remain mysterious to the broader 
community.  
2.1.3 COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKERS 
As respected members of the community, 
community health workers (RECO) were 
invaluable in RCCE activities. Given their 
experience, they were able to begin activities 
right away, doing from ‘door to door’ and 
promoting open discussions and providing 
community feedback for response teams. RECO 
activities were coordinated through the 
community outreach units (CAC). 
However, they often lacked the equipment and 
support (e.g. bicycles or motorbikes, fuel, torches, 
LOCAL CAPACITY 
Ministry of Public Health (MPH) - Develops health policies and standards and coordinates technical and 
financial partners, such as donors and NGOs at the national level. 
National Institute of Biomedical Research (Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale or INRB) – Established in 
1984, it provides laboratories for experts working on haemorrhagic fevers (Marburg and Ebola) and other 
tropical diseases. 
Provincial health division (DPS) – Collects, analyzes, and interprets health data from the health zones. It 
transmits information to administrative provincial authorities as well as the MPH. 
Health area development committee (CODESA) – Includes members from important social groups, local 
networks and opinion leaders, and social service partners, and works at the level of the health area, each of 
which contains approximately one health center. The CODESA participates in health activity planning, 
management, and monitoring; conducts community mobilization; receives reports from the CAC; and meets 
monthly with health center staff to analyze results and resolve issues. 
Community health workers (relais communautaire or RECO) - RECOs are volunteers who have promoted and 
provided health interventions in communities for many years. RECOs are volunteers who deliver a minimum 
package of activities related to reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health (RMNCH), including 
integrated community case management for malaria, diarrhea, and respiratory diseases; nutrition; WASH; 
HIV and AIDS; and disease prevention. RECOs conduct home visits, household mapping, referrals, monitoring, 
and community-based surveillance. They have three-year renewable contracts with local authorities but can 
be replaced before the end of the contract if the community is unsatisfied with their performance.  
Community outreach units (Cellule d’Animation Communautaire or CAC) - Led by an elected local leader (the 
community animator, or ‘AC’), they comprise influential elected individuals from that locality, including RECO. 
The CAC meets monthly and reports to the CODESA. It coordinates village development activities; promotes 
healthy behaviors; coordinates RECO activities, including delivery of the minimum health package; supports 
distribution of health products; conducts community mapping and monitoring; and manages community care 
sites. 
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watches, phone credit) necessary to undertake 
their work. Several met with resistance early in 
the epidemic and would have appreciated official 
uniforms which they could have used to 
legitimate the messages they were giving people. 
The RECO who participated in this research 
emphasized the quality of the WHO/UNICEF 
training they received through Oxfam, IFRC and 
CARITAS. However, representatives of CAC and 
community health committees (CODESA) felt that 
WHO workshops would have been more effective 
and wide-reaching if they had been conducted in 
collaboration with the CAC and CODESA, as 
UNICEF training workshops were.  
Many RECO who participated in the research 
were frustrated at the discrepancies in pay – and 
late payments – between different organizations 
(i.e. UNICEF and WHO). Many RECO argued that 
just because they are normally volunteers, does 
not mean they should be paid so little ($2 per day 
for some) to do work which they found dangerous 
and stigmatizing. They were particularly 
frustrated by this when word circulated that 
certain international responders were receiving a 
per diem of $300 per day, while working in air-
conditioned rooms in the coordination offices.  
Operational recommendations 
›› Provide RECO with logistical support (e.g. 
bicycles, phone credit, watches, torches). 
›› Make sure that RECO are being paid fairly, 
consistently and on-time.  Psycho-social experts 
should be assigned to support RECO who may be 
stigmatized or encounter resistance. 
2.1.4 LOCAL LEADERS 
The engagement of trusted local authorities and 
community leaders is essential in order to stem 
misinformation and fear, to encourage people to 
report symptoms, to help minimize social 
stigmatization, and to facilitate exchange 
between the response and communities. 
However, in rural Congolese communities, there 
is rarely one community leader, and a range of 
leaders should be targeted. 
The first of these are customary leaders – village 
chiefs or ‘groupement’ chiefs and village elders. 
Customary leaders, elders and traditional healers 
                                                          
31 Gillespie, Obregon et al. (2016). 
have many traditional ways of stimulating 
community support or adherence.  
The second are religious leaders. They are 
trusted members of the community who people 
turn to in ties of sickness and distress, and their 
word carries weight. They also have the attention 
of large numbers of the population at least once 
a week, and sometimes every morning or 
evening. As one pastor explained: 
Most rural Congolese are Christian (even as they 
simultaneously hold non-Christian beliefs). 
However, there are a wide variety of churches. 
During the epidemic, the Catholic Church was 
very active in RCCE and suspended sacraments.  
The Protestant Church (federated under the 
Eglise de Christ du Congo) also participated in 
RCCE and attempted to support affected 
protestant communities. However, they often 
lacked the support of CARITAS, a formal structure 
of the Catholic Church providing logistics, 
healthcare and sustainable development, and a 
local partner of UNICEF. We were told by two 
Protestant pastors that CARITAS supports 
Catholic churches and health clinics more than 
Protestant ones, even with epidemic funds. It is 
essential that CARITAS distribute resources 
supplied by partners like UNICEF fairly, regardless 
of religious denomination. 
The response was not successful in engaging the 
majority of Pentecostal churches, some of which 
were actively opposed to the response’s Ebola 
narrative and RCCE efforts. Response teams 
should try to engage the leaders of Pentecostal 
churches into the response by reaching out to 
them directly and through adherents who are 
themselves heath actors. 
It is important to remain aware that recruitment 
of traditional leaders runs the risk of ignoring the 
needs and voices of marginalized populations.31 
See also: 1.1.2 Ethnic minorities; 1.1.3 Gender.  
Trusted community leaders do not always 
coincide with self-appointed leaders, and social 
scientists should attempt to identify important 
“If the message has not been 
relayed by a religious leader, then 
you might as well say the message 
has not been received” 
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local leaders through discussions with the 
community, while attempting also to look for 
power struggles or conflicts.  
Operational recommendation 
›› Pastors should be trained in risk communication 
and encouraged to cascade information to their 
congregations. As should church-based 
community mobilizers. Religious leaders would 
also benefit from psycho-social training and could 
be encouraged to organize support groups in 
which people could voice their anxieties about the 
epidemic and the response. 
2.1.5 ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
At the onset of the epidemic, there were many 
alternative explanations for the escalating 
community deaths. Many of these centered on 
accusations of witchcraft connected to land 
disputes, to punishment by ancestors or angered 
traditional healers, or to jealousy or revenge.32 
The reason that these stories continued to 
persist throughout the epidemic, and continue to 
do so even now, when most people believe that 
the deaths were connected to the Ebola virus, is 
that even when it is accepted that an individual 
has a biomedical disease (e.g. tuberculosis), 
family members will still search for the reason 
why that individual became sick with that disease.  
Other stories also abound concerning, not the 
origins of the outbreak, but the reason for which 
it continued to spread to other villages. Some 
people believed that foreign and national 
response teams had used the spate of community 
deaths to come and infect people with Ebola to 
make money during the response and through 
the deployment of the vaccine. This is connected 
to a fear and suspicion held by many people that 
biomedical and traditional healers have the 
power to kill as well as the power to cure.  
Communication teams must make it their 
priority to tackle misinformation at every level of 
community engagement, by providing clear, 
consistent information and listening to concerns. 
In official terminology in the North Kivu outbreak, 
the terms ‘alternative explanations’ and 
‘circulating stories’ are already being 
preferentially deployed over ‘rumor tracking’, 
which suggests negative and false information. 
It is important to understand the factors which 
lead to alternative explanations – they are not 
simply the product of ‘ignorance,’ but are often 
based on past experience, on particular local 
histories and politics and on very real fears. 
Communication teams should understand the 
underlying basis and stakes of alternative 
explanations in order to integrate counter-
arguments into their messaging and community 
engagement activities. 
2.1.6 USING MEDIA 
Language and literacy are important factors when 
considering the use of media in RCCE. Several 
local community animators told us that people in 
the villages of Bikoro and Iboko health zones 
could not understand the health education 
posters and flyers due to high levels of illiteracy.  
Furthermore, one Mbandaka-based sociologist 
informed us that people found the imaging 
confusing – e.g. the man wrapped in a blanket did 
not make them think of fever, but rather that a 
cure for Ebola was to wrap up in warm clothes.  
The sociologist emphasized that oral 
communication is much more effective in rural 
Congolese villages than visual communication. 
This was echoed by community members who 
emphasized the importance of radio and the use 
of megaphones. Better than megaphones, 
according to RECO, however, was the ‘door to 
door’ (porte a porte) method, in which they 
visited each family in order to spend time 
explaining the RCCE messages to them in person. 
Communications teams should prioritize oral 
communication in the form of announcements, 
information sessions, radio programs and ‘door 
by door’ communication in order to meet the 
delivery needs of rural populations. In North Kivu, 
advances are also being made with music, social 
media platforms and mobile phone messaging. 33 
Operational recommendation 
›› Communications teams should work with local 
artists and social scientists to create risk 
communication media, rather than bringing pre-
made posters and flyers. 
                                                          
32 More detail is provided in Duda (2018). 33 Bedford (2018b). 
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2.2 CONTACT TRACING & VACCINATION  
This section outlines how response teams successfully ‘broke the transmission chain’ through surveillance, 
contact tracing and the first vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) deployment during an active Ebola epidemic. During 
interviews, several local doctors suggested that the epidemic would have been ‘a catastrophe’ without the 
vaccine. However, the section also examines the short-comings of the vaccine deployment in Equateur, and 
the ways in which future campaigns could be improved. 
2.2.1 CONTACT TRACING 
Contact tracing relies on identifying those who 
have had close contact with an infected person, 
as well as contacts of those contacts, so that they 
can be monitored for symptoms of the disease. 
Some of these people may be incubating the 
disease, and the purpose of contact tracing is to 
locate them to that they can be vaccinated and 
monitored.  
RECO were as invaluable in tracing contacts and 
monitoring contacts as they were in risk 
communication activities. Understanding local 
family structures and how this translates into 
responsibilities for care and burial is crucial to 
understanding mobility and being able to locate 
contacts. This is where RECO’s experience and 
embeddedness within communities becomes 
indispensable.  
These RECO often lacked the equipment and 
support necessary to undertake and coordinate 
their work – especially when contacts were 
hidden in difficult-to-access forest or river camps 
necessitating ‘expeditionary surveillance.’ They 
were also frustrated at the discrepancies in pay – 
and late payments – and in organization between 
different organizations (i.e. UNICEF and WHO).  
Given their daily interactions with contacts, they 
lamented that they were not offered full personal 
protective equipment (PPE). This equipment was 
determined by epidemiologists to be unnecessary 
for RECO, if this is the case then they require 
further training in order to be reassured of this. 
Several presidents of the local health 
committees (CODESA), themselves RECO, argued 
that many RECO were frustrated in their efforts to 
complete their tasks because they could not read 
the forms they were asked to fill out. They 
suggested that in future epidemics, organizations 
coordinate their efforts and ask CODESA 
presidents to suggest suitable (literate and 
reliable) RECO.  
Some community animators (AC) pointed to the 
ways they coordinate other epidemic (e.g. 
cholera) surveillance, with weekly schedules, so 
that they can easily localize RECO. They noted 
that the Ebola epidemic was more pressurized 
and chaotic but suggested that being more 
involved in the initial selection and coordination 
of RECO would have made surveillance run more 
smoothly and effectively. 
Several of the AC we interviewed who had 
supervised RECO, lamented the different forms 
used by UNICEF and WHO, which made it more 
complicated for them to synthesize data and 
transmit it in their own reports. In order to 
complete this painstaking work each day, they 
would have appreciated access to a computer and 
printer. They would also have appreciated 
compilation forms, where they could rapidly 
synthesize the data provided by RECO. They also 
noted that sometimes they were not provided 
with enough forms and could have benefitted 
from access to a photocopier in order to provide 
for all the RECO under their supervision. 
Some RECO suggested that they had not been 
taught how to fill out the forms correctly, and that 
in some cases they were not paid when forms had 
mistakes, despite the fact that they had worked 
that day. Once again, this may have been avoided 
if AC and presidents of CODESA had coordinated 
the deployment of RECO from the start.  
Operational recommendations 
›› Provide RECO with logistical support (e.g. 
bicycles, phone credit, watches, torches). 
›› Involve AC and CODESA in the selection and 
coordination of RECO right from the start – work 
with them in order to homogenize forms, create 
synthesis forms and schedule RECO activities. 
Make efforts to give RECO supervisors access to 
computers and photocopiers. 
2.2.2 MONITORING 
Once contacts have been established and located, 
they are interviewed and checked for symptoms 
(particularly temperature). If the contact is found 
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to be symptomatic, they should be transported to 
an Ebola treatment center and tested there. 
Testing the patient while they are still in the 
community is to be avoided, as it delays moving 
them to a safer location.  
All close contacts were monitored for 21 days 
following their last known exposure to a case. 
They were monitored on a daily basis and their 
temperature taken.  
Contacts were also encouraged not to leave 
their houses (and thus limited in their economic 
activities). Provision of food was the primary 
concern for people when committing to isolation, 
and they were therefore given supplementary 
food (rice, beans, oil) by UNICEF and WFP.  
RECO worked in close collaboration with the 
psycho-social experts, who sought to reduce 
stigmatization of those affected (including the 
families of contacts) by counselling those affected 
and educating and reassuring families and 
neighbors. Many families cited this distribution as 
one of the factors which made them collaborate 
with the response. 
2.2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF THE VACCINE 
Frontline health workers were vaccinated, 
followed by a ‘ring vaccination’ method which 
targeted contacts of patients and contacts of 
contacts. Communication around the vaccine is 
crucial as negative community perceptions and 
understandings of why some people are 
vaccinated and others not augments social risks 
associated with distrust, suspicion and 
stigmatization.  
Despite concerns that communities may be 
resistant to it, however, the ring vaccination 
campaign was largely successful.  
Nonetheless, there were, and continue to be, 
certain negative perceptions surrounding it. 
Some of these include rumors that Ebola was re-
introduced to the DRC to enable the experimental 
rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine to be trialed. Other fears 
were that the vaccine would kill or sterilize those 
who received it, or that it would give them Ebola. 
This fear was especially prevalent among Twa 
communities, and was best countered by RECO 
and APS who were themselves PA. See also 1.1.2: 
Ethnic minorities.  
                                                          
34 Anoko & Falero (2018). 
There was some concern about ‘resistance’ to 
the vaccine among Twa communities.34 
Adherents of certain evangelical and revivalist 
movements also appear to have been opposed.  
While overall people were satisfied with the 
follow-up exams and treatment they received for 
side-effects, the initial fear, and a lingering 
concern, are very real. Several of the people who 
participated in the research continued to 
experience pain in their arms at the site of the 
injection several months later. In one village, 
several people reported feeling nauseous in the 
first 2-3 days, and then feeling incredibly hungry 
– a hunger which was still with them to this day. 
Further research must be conducted to 
determine the long-term physical effects of the 
vaccine, as well as the ways in which is comes to 
symbolize larger grievances with the response. 
We also came across several villages where 
people did not feel that they had given their 
informed consent prior to the vaccination. There 
appear to have been discrepancies in the 
deployment of the vaccine, with some people 
having read and signed consent forms before 
their inoculation, and others being presented 
with the forms only after they had been 
inoculated. People also lamented the fact that 
consent forms were written in French, even 
though many people either do not speak the 
language or cannot read. This was a source of 
particular concern for those who said that they 
had not even realized that the vaccine was 
experimental until after it had been administered.  
Several of the people who participated in the 
research felt that they had been used as test 
subjects for pharmaceutical companies which 
would now make billions of dollars selling the 
vaccines:  
Education campaigns need to be sensitive to fears 
which are not purely about ignorance, but about 
a real affective and visceral feeling of fear – 
communities cannot simply be given information, 
they must be given reassurance and allowed to 
voice their fears and concerns in order to 
progressively develop communications around 
“They will sell that vaccine for 
billions. It was tested on us, but we 
will not benefit.” 
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the vaccine, including in the months following 
vaccination. See also: 3.1.5 Embezzlement & 
unfulfilled promises. 
Even if they are not contacts, it may be 
beneficial to publicly vaccinate influential 
community leaders and administrators who 
volunteer for the vaccine in order to reassure the 
broader community. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Rumors about the vaccine can be combatted 
most effectively if education, information and 
reassurance is given to whole communities, and 
not simply to those within the ring, so they can 
understand why the vaccine is recommended for 
certain community members and not others.  
2.2.4 SIDE EFFECTS OF THE VACCINE 
There were also issues around the 
communication of risk to pregnant women. Until 
the ethics committee came to its decision on the 
protocol for pregnant and breastfeeding women 
(i.e. during the first few days of the campaign), 
these women were vaccinated – apparently 
without any supplemental information on 
potential health risks. People who participated in 
the research described one woman who had a 
miscarriage afterwards, and one woman who had 
a still birth. We also heard reports of other 
women who experienced bleeding after the 
vaccine. These women blame the vaccine and 
demand ‘justice’ and compensation for their loss.  
Protocols for obtaining consent should always 
be followed, and information given in a language 
and format which patients can easily understand. 
Any populations at higher risk (e.g. pregnant 
women) should have this clearly explained to 
them at some length before receiving the vaccine. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Aftercare should be provided to women who lost 
a child after being vaccinated.  
2.2.5 VACCINE: BARRIERS TO ACCESS 
The vaccine was so popular that many of the 
people who participated in the research said that 
after an initial fear and resistance, they had 
sought out the vaccine only to be denied. In most 
cases, this was because they were outside the 
ring. However, many people had understood that 
the vaccine had simply ‘run out.’ This 
misunderstanding suggests that more could be 
done to inform broader communities about the 
role of the vaccine campaign. 
In one village, we were told that once contacts 
and health actors had been vaccinated, the 
vaccine was opened up to village leaders (such as 
religious leaders and elders). We could not verify 
this information, but if it is true, then it may have 
contributed to understandings that the vaccines 
simply ‘ran out.’ 
More worryingly, however, we also found 
several cases of close contacts who had not been 
vaccinated despite the fact that they would have 
liked to be. Some were elderly or sick people who 
had not been able to make the journey from their 
village or homestead to the health center where 
the vaccines were being administered. Others 
were widows who, despite being in direct contact 
with deceased husbands, were in a period of 
mourning and seclusion which did not permit 
them to leave their homes to travel to the health 
centers. Other contacts said that they had simply 
not been informed about the vaccine campaign. 
Health actors with whom we spoke compared 
the vaccine campaign unfavorably with their own 
routine vaccine campaigns, in which they go from 
door to door to make sure that all children are 
vaccinated. They argued that restricting the 
vaccine teams exclusively to health centers (some 
up to 10km from contacts’ homes) limited the 
number of people eligible for the vaccine who 
could actually attend the vaccination. Health 
actors also pointed to the fact that some people 
were temporarily absent in hunting, fishing or 
gathering camps deep in the forest, and that the 
campaign should have passed through again one 
or two weeks later in order to reach those people 
who had returned from the forest. 
Vaccination protocol should consider the 
benefits of vaccinating community health 
workers, hygienists and burial teams. If this is 
determined to be unnecessary, then these people 
should have the reasons for this decision clearly 
explained to them. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Vaccine teams should consider visiting villages 
twice to reach people who were temporarily 
absent, and actively going to the homes of people 
who cannot travel to health centers but are 
nonetheless close contacts.  
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2.3 TREATMENT OF THE SICK AND DECEASED 
This section outlines the significant improvements which response teams have made in caring for the sick 
and the deceased since the first Ebola epidemic in 1976. Even during the West Africa crisis, 2-4 years ago, 
ETCs were often thought of as ‘death camps’ – by the end of the Ebola epidemic in Equateur, however, they 
were being referred to as ‘paradise-like.’ Nonetheless, improvements can still be made in several aspects of 
care, especially through community participation in safe and dignified burials. 
2.3.1 TAKING BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES 
One of the strongest cases of resistance 
encountered by response teams was against the 
taking of biological samples from suspected cases 
(sick patients or the deceased). 
There are two primary reasons for this 
resistance: (1) people fear that in taking samples, 
response teams may give them Ebola or in some 
other way harm them; (2) early in the epidemic, 
being diagnosed with Ebola, or having a deceased 
family member diagnosed with Ebola post-
mortem, was a source of shame and stigma.  
It is from the practice of taking blood samples 
that response teams acquire the name of 
‘vampires’ or ‘blood-suckers’ (suceurs de sang in 
French). It is often rumored that they take such 
samples in order to bewitch a patient or else sell 
his or her blood or body parts. It is particularly 
difficult to convince family members to allow 
samples to be taken from a deceased relative, as 
by that point, nothing more can be done to treat 
or save them. 
To get around this early resistance, several 
health actors admitted to telling patients that 
they would have a routine exam of blood, urine 
and stool samples for another disease, and then 
secretly testing their sample for Ebola. This clearly 
raises ethical concerns around consent, but it was 
framed by health actors as the best way to 
minimize the stigma and fear associated with 
being tested for Ebola. 
One of the most impactful issues, in the long 
term, concerns the fact that patients are seldom 
informed about a negative result. This leaves 
many people wondering whether they or their 
family members had EVD. Given the significant 
food and monetary assistance Ebola survivors 
have received, this has led some people, 
particularly in the village of Boyeka (which some 
believe may have been the source of the Ebola 
outbreak as far back as January 2018), to make 
claims on the government and response, 
demanding that they receive the same level of 
support and compensation for their losses. The 
authorities, however, refuse to do so, saying that 
an epidemiological team tested certain cases in 
Boyeka and found no evidence of Ebola. However, 
the affected community has never officially been 
informed. 
Response teams must work closely with 
community health workers in order to provide 
families with accurate information and allay their 
fears. The first people to speak with affected 
families should be communications and psycho-
social experts, in order to minimize the attention 
and shame which can accompany the appearance 
of a biomedical team.  
Furthermore, it is imperative that individuals, 
families and communities tested for Ebola are 
informed, in a timely manner, if their results are 
negative.  
2.3.2 PERCEPTIONS OF ETCS 
Ebola Treatment Centers (ETCs) are often 
established alongside functioning health facilities. 
MSF set up their initial ETC close to Bikoro general 
hospital. However, given that people had 
travelled from villages in that health zone to a 
closer hospital in Itipo village, many cases were 
being diagnosed more than 40km from the MSF 
ETC, requiring patients to travel (or be 
transported) far from their families for treatment. 
This greatly exacerbated resistance at the start of 
the epidemic. 
People often find Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) frightening, saying that doctors 
look like ‘monsters’ or ‘aliens.’ This can be 
minimized if suits are taken on and off in public, 
and by making sure that doctors never arrive in a 
village already wearing them. 
As the epidemic progressed, people became 
less afraid of ETC. This was due to two primary 
factors: (1) the opening of an ALIMA ETC in Itipo 
which meant that patients did not have to travel 
far from home; (2) the reintegration of Ebola 
survivors who had been successfully treated in 
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ETCs. Survivors and their testimonies can 
demystify ETCs, and they often play an important 
role in bringing trust and hope to communities 
about patient care in the ETCs, and proving, 
through their own experience, that with 
treatment and care, people can survive.  
In the West Africa outbreak, community 
members and leaders were given tours of ETC 
‘green zones’. This was not the case in Equateur, 
but several people who participated in the 
research had heard positive stories about ETCs 
both from survivors and from community 
members working as hygienists, nurses or on 
construction work around the ETCs. 
The importance of family care and of not being 
isolated should not be underestimated. Typically, 
when rural people spend time in hospital, they 
are accompanied by their family, who become 
their ‘guardians’ (garde malade in French). The 
role of such guardians is not simply to provide 
solidarity and companionship through the 
biomedical process, but also to provide meals for 
the patient (food is not provided at hospital), 
giving additional personal care, negotiating their 
treatment (including payment) and advocating 
with health workers on their behalf. 
Some of the people who spoke about early 
experience with ETC, told of frightening and 
confusing encounters in which they were not kept 
informed about the status of their family member 
and about the kind of treatment they were 
receiving.  
The response must negotiate a delicate balance 
between encouraging patients to seek treatment 
at an ETC, where they can be monitored and 
isolated, and recognizing that patients are there 
voluntarily. This is especially complex when 
patients are too weak to express their wishes and 
when families must make decisions on their 
behalf. The two patients who were taken from the 
ETC in Mbandaka on 22 May, sought alternative 
treatment at church prayer groups. The family 
told us that they were then taken back to the ETC 
by police and soldiers by force.  
However, towards the end of the outbreak, 
patients were actively seeking out treatment at 
the ALIMA ETC in Itipo. While no confirmed Ebola 
cases were treated at this ETC, several health 
workers and other community members 
described it as ‘like paradise,’ with good food, 
                                                          
35 Richards et al (2015). 
clean sheets, air conditioning, music playing, toys 
for children to play with. They also appreciated 
the ALIMA Biosecure Emergency Care Units 
(CUBE) because they were able to see family 
members throughout their treatment and wave 
to them from a distance.  
In order to demystify ETCs, response teams 
should introduce people to hazmat suits and body 
bags during risk communication activities and 
survivors (including the national survivors’ 
association, ANVE) should be employed in RCCE 
activities and on radio programs. Some survivors 
can also provide help within ETCs themselves, 
given that they are no longer at risk of Ebola 
contamination. 
Engaging religious leaders to hold prayer 
sessions in proximity to the sick (but behind 
protective barriers) in ETCs, may also provide 
psychosocial support and discourage patients 
from absconding to seek alternative treatment. 
Operational recommendations 
›› The initial epidemiological investigation should 
determine the epicenter of the epidemic, and the 
ETC should be set up as close to that epicenter as 
possible to minimize the distance patients need to 
travel from their families for treatment.  
›› Patients cannot be treated as atomized 
individuals. Their families must be kept informed 
and involved at all stages of treatment.  
2.3.3 SAFE AND DIGNIFIED BURIALS 
Ebola has been called a ‘disease of social intimacy’ 
because it disproportionately affects those 
meeting their social responsibilities to care for 
their loved ones, including healers and doctors, 
who are highly respected people in their 
communities.35 
While much is often made of the role of health 
actors as agents in ‘super-spreading events’, the 
Itipo nurse who contaminated several other 
people, did so not through medical practice, but 
because he was a respected and beloved member 
of the community, whose body was carried by 
many and whose funeral was attended by several 
hundred people. This example serves to illustrate 
that safe burials are one of the most important 
PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA | 34  
 
elements in breaking the transmission chain of 
EVD.  
Safe, securitized burials are also an important 
site of resistance. This has been reported in 
previous outbreaks and centers on the fact that 
deceased Ebola patients have often been buried 
by response teams without a funeral or coffin and 
without the presence of family members. It is well 
documented that having no proof of death and 
not being able to bury a relative in an acceptable 
manner, compounds the distress experienced by 
communities and fuels suspicions that people are 
being murdered and their organs and body parts 
sold by response teams. This can have a 
continuing and devastating impact on the 
everyday life and long-term mental health of 
affected communities.  
It is for this reason that protocol now specifies 
use of the term ‘safe and dignified burial.’ 
Dignified means that burials should be 
appropriate for the cultural context and take 
account of the individual preferences of families 
on the timing and location of the burial, and on 
important ritual and aesthetic elements, 
including a coffin, prayers and the possibility for 
mourners to see the deceased’s face. Viewing the 
body and face of the deceased is often of crucial 
importance, both as a way for family and friends 
to pay their respects to the deceased, and to 
provide visual confirmation of death and of an 
unmutilated corpse. 
Response teams face numerous logistical 
challenges, particularly in the case of ‘community 
deaths.’ People told us that they waited hours or 
days for the Croix Rouge burial team to arrive, and 
ended up burying relatives themselves and 
without protection. We also heard stories from 
the early stages of the epidemic where people 
heard of a relative’s death through unofficial 
channels before being informed by a health 
official. The timely announcement of death and 
undertaking of an SDB should be priorities for 
response teams. 
The critical importance of involving 
communities in the adjustment of SDB protocols 
to ensure they are locally appropriate and 
acceptable, keeping family members well 
informed and facilitating their engagement with 
SDB practices, and providing sustained 
psychosocial support, cannot be over-
emphasized. 
SDB should be a priority right from the start of 
the response and people should not be left 
waiting for a burial team for long when there is a 
community death – RECO can be used to monitor 
the sick and to inform teams when a death 
appears imminent. 
Efforts need to be made in risk communication 
and with psycho-social experts to inform 
communities about the importance of SDB and to 
gather feedback on appropriate SDB for the 
cultural context. Focus groups can help response 
teams prepare appropriate materials and 
resources, but SDB should always be conducted 
according to guidance from the bereaved family 
itself.   
It is important that families give prior consent 
for an SDB and that they are not coerced by 
military, police or health authorities. Efforts 
should be made to assure that SDB teams always 
include one psycho-social expert. The response 
may also consider including religious or 
customary leaders, who would benefit from the 
training and information and could help to put 
bereaved families at ease. 
Operational recommendation 
›› SDB teams should provide coffins and a small 
contribution for the funerary rituals of Ebola 
victims and cloth to line the coffin.  
2.3.4 FREE HEALTH CARE 
Free health care during and after the epidemic 
has helped to strengthen and rebuild people’s 
trust in health structures and practitioners and 
has led to early reporting and presentation of 
signs and symptoms, thus facilitating surveillance 
efforts. It is one of the most widely praised public 
health strategies of the intervention. 
However, it is not without its challenges. At first, 
people were very suspicious, and some people 
avoided the health centers, fearing that free 
medications were people used to give people 
Ebola. These fears had been reduced by RCCE and 
when people treated did not catch EVD. However, 
people also found the infrared thermometers 
frightening, because they resemble guns and do 
not need to touch a person in order to read their 
temperature, but do so, as if ‘by witchcraft’ 
(kindoki in Lingala). 
PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA | 35  
 
More importantly, however, free health care 
has put the whole rural health system under 
strain. This is not simply because they are 
understaffed and experiencing high demand – 
hundreds of patients per day according to one of 
the nurses who participated in the research. It is 
also because many rural nurses do not receive a 
regular state salary, or any salary at all (many lack 
a social security number and there are numerous 
obstacles to transferring money to rural areas 
with no banks for hundreds of miles). These 
nurses make a living by charging for consultations, 
or by making a small profit on the sale of 
medicines. Nurses (who often work in villages 
which are not their own, and therefore cannot 
rely on family support networks) use the money 
they earn through consultations to buy 
agricultural produce.  As one nurse explained: 
While rural health actors are supposed to receive 
support and compensation for this lost income, in 
practice, many of those who participated in the 
research said that they had received nothing. 
While some were receiving gifts from the people 
they were treating, many of the nurses we spoke 
with were struggling to support themselves, let 
alone afford their children’s school fees. Some 
said that this was leading certain members of the 
community to mock and stigmatize them, while 
their own family members continued to ostracize 
them for fear of catching EVD. 
Some doctors in Mbandaka accused rural 
nurses of continuing to charge people for health 
services. We were unable to verify these claims. 
However, some of the nurses who participated in 
the research said that they were charging people 
for medicines which had run out and were now 
only available in the nurses’ own pre-Ebola 
stockpiles (which they had bought with their own 
money).  
The depletion of medications was the only 
universal criticism which we heard about free 
health care. Nurses told us that many of the most 
commonly used medications had run out and 
were not being restocked, while other, less useful 
medications were being replenished but left 
unused. Nurses would have preferred to order in 
those medications they needed most and should 
be given the possibility to offer feedback on the 
medications and supplied they require and to 
place orders.  
Psycho-social experts should be assigned to 
support health actors who may be stigmatized in 
their own families and within the communities 
they treat. 
Operational recommendation 
›› Free health care must imperatively be 
accompanied by the full and timely payment of 
rural health actors and structures put in place to 
check and monitor this payment. 
 
  
“The health centre is my field; if I 
cannot harvest from it, I will 
starve.” 
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PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA: 
RECOVERY 
 
For an Ebola outbreak to be officially declared over, two incubation periods (a total of 42 days) must 
pass without any confirmed cases. Traditionally, recovery efforts focus on governments driving the safe 
reactivation of essential health services and tackling pre-existing health system constraints that 
contributed to delayed detection and early spread of the virus. Immediate recovery efforts should lay 
the foundations for a stronger, more resilient health system, and thus feed back into preparedness. 
However, the research conducted in preparation for this report has suggested that recovery should be 
conceptualized beyond the improvement of health services and should encompass the broader psycho-
social and economic impacts of the epidemic. This section of the report provides detail on the 
challenges with which communities and individuals affected by the 2018 Equateur outbreak continue 
to struggle, and to suggest an approach to Ebola epidemics which would plan for life ‘post-Ebola’ at 
each stage of the response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
RECOVERY
PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE
Capacity-building recommendation 
The survivors’ association, ANVE, should be assisted in establishing local 
support groups for those directly affected by the epidemic, as well as 
supported in reaching out to other survivor groups in West Africa and DRC. 
Operational recommendation 
Prioritize the de-stigmatization of affected 
communities by neighboring villages so that markets 
and other economic activities can resume as soon as 
the epidemic is declared over.  
Capacity-building recommendation 
Long-term investment in affected communities should be an 
integral part of response efforts. Efforts should be made to 
provide school fees for children of victims and of survivors, 
and widows, widowers and/or the parents of victims should 
be provided with a donation to contribute to funerary 
expenses and customary debts. 
Operational recommendation 
In order to minimize inter-generational and intra-communal 
conflict, village elders should be asked to suggest young people 
from different families interested in working. Employees should 
work in shifts or on rotation, with adequate rest days built in so 
that they can work on their fields. 
Operational recommendation 
Social scientists should work with national 
and regional authorities to minimize 
embezzlement and corruption as it relates 
to Ebola resources. 
Lys Alcayna-Stevens, 2018 
Planning for Post-Ebola: Lessons learned from DR Congo’s 9th epidemic 
New York: Communication for Development, UNICEF 
PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA | 38  
 
3. RECOVERY 
 
3.1 ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
Response teams must consider from the outset the kinds of enduring impacts their presence could have on 
local economies. This section outlines the significant economic impacts that an Ebola epidemic has on 
survivors, their families, the families of victims, and broader communities. It also examines the unintended 
economic impacts that the Ebola response teams have on local economies and on the economic conditions 
of individual families. 
3.1.1 COST OF LIVING 
Itipo village became one of the epicenters of the 
epidemic, and had, at one point, teams of over 
200 national and international personnel. While 
much of their food and equipment was brought in 
by helicopter, the response teams nonetheless 
consumed some local goods, including domestic 
livestock, water (for washing) and products for 
sale at the market.  
One of the most common complaints we heard 
against these response teams, was that they had 
increased the cost of living for ordinary people. As 
one man explained, with reference to the Twa 
who Nkundo people employ to work in their 
fields: 
This increase in the cost of labor was due to the 
fact that workers were being paid up to 8,000FC 
for a day’s work (such as digging latrines or 
building fences) and had therefore begun to 
refuse the exploitatively low pay that they had 
received in the past for hard agricultural labor. 
Others found work for the response washing 
clothes, fetching water, acting as security guards 
or building structures. All of these activities had 
an impact on local labor economies, just as the 
sale of domestic livestock at ‘foreigner prices’ 
(ntalo ya mindele in Lingala), impacted the market 
price of livestock. 
The relatively sudden imbalances in wealth 
between those who had worked for the response 
and those who had not, also created a lot of 
resentment and bad feeling (motema mabe in 
Lingala) between neighbors and friends, and 
within families. In some cases, the employment of 
young men, and their rapid acquisition of wealth, 
led to intergenerational conflict. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Social scientists should be deployed to conduct 
research with communities to determine potential 
impacts and conduct a rapid assessment based on 
a study of local economies and the labor and 
resources the response team will require  
›› Social scientists should also assess the impacts 
of privileging one generation over another in terms 
of employment. It may be beneficial to ask all 
village elders to suggest several young people from 
their own family who would be interested in 
working, so that certain families do not benefit 
more than others. 
3.1.2 FOOD CRISIS 
Several nurses, particularly in the smallest 
villages, who were very concerned about a 
looming food crisis. They spoke of an alarming rise 
in the number of malnourished children they 
were seeing. They attributed this to the following 
6 factors: 
(1) While working for the response, people had 
neglected work in their fields; (2) Survivors 
suffering from post-Ebola syndrome, and families 
decimated by the epidemic no longer had the 
labor-power necessary to work on their fields; (3) 
Contacts – as well as others in the community – 
had stayed away from their fields out of necessity 
(to stay isolated and not to travel), or fear, during 
the active outbreak; (4) Due to the effects of the 
response on the local economy, people were now 
unable to afford the (Twa) agricultural labor they 
had previously relied upon; (5) Fear and stigma 
“We used to pay 1,000FC for a 
field, now we have to pay 
2,000FC or more!” 
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during and immediately after the epidemic meant 
that, on the one hand, people were prevented 
from selling their agricultural or forest products in 
other villages, and on the other hand, traders no 
longer game to sell goods in their villages; (6) Fear 
surrounding bushmeat meant that children were 
no longer receiving an important source of 
protein, and were increasingly presenting to 
health centers with kwashiorkor.  
Several members of the community expressed 
frustration and resentment that only directly-
affected families had received food aid, and yet 
the food crisis would affect almost everyone. 
Operational recommendations 
›› During the outbreak, labor should be divided in 
a predictable, rather than haphazard fashion, so 
that people do not waste the morning hours (when 
much agricultural labor is undertaken) waiting at 
the coordination office to see if they will be offered 
work.  All employees and laborers should work in 
shifts or on rotation, with adequate rest days built 
in so that they can work on their fields.  
›› Communications teams should prioritize the de-
stigmatization of affected communities in the 
surrounding region, so that markets and other 
economic activities can resume as soon as the 
epidemic is declared over. 
›› Response teams and their local partners should 
consider providing victims, survivors and contacts 
who were unable to undertake subsistence 
activities during the active phase of the epidemic 
with pest-resistant seeds of manioc, rice, soy, 
legumes and vegetables to kick-start their 
subsistence activities. 
3.1.3 LOST PROPERTY 
The first complaint of every affected family which 
participated in the research, was that response 
teams (Croix Rouge RDC) had burned items 
belonging to the patient or the deceased and had 
not replaced those items nor offered 
compensation. This has also been reported for 
previous epidemics.36  
For the families involved, these were often 
valuable items, which were difficult to replace, or 
required monetary resources which they did not 
possess, such as beds and mattresses. One man 
explained to us that his mobile phone had been 
                                                          
36 Epelboin et al (2008).  
destroyed when decontamination teams sprayed 
him and his possessions with chlorine. 
Some people acknowledged that they had 
received small tokens of compensation, but the 
majority assured us that they had received no 
replacement or compensation for their loss. The 
experience was often a traumatic one which 
people felt augmented stigmatization. 
The issue was even more complex in cases 
where families had, in fear and panic, destroyed 
or threw away other items, such as pots and pans, 
without instruction from response teams.  
Operational recommendation 
›› It is important that communications teams 
address clearly which personal possessions run the 
risk of contaminating others (e.g. soiled 
mattresses), and which do not (e.g. metal pots and 
pans). 
3.1.4 DEBT AND FUNERARY COSTS 
When a man dies, his widow becomes responsible 
for the debts he had accrued while alive. These 
debts are often connected to the family’s home 
(building a house out of durable materials such as 
bricks or a tin roof, adding doors, building beds or 
tables). Sometimes they are for purchases such as 
a radio or bicycle. In any case, they were always 
incurred by a family with the anticipation that the 
couple’s combined labor would eventually result 
in the debt being paid off. When one person dies 
– and especially when this is the husband – the 
widow(er) finds themselves in a very difficult 
situation, often unable to pay off the debt. 
Widow(er)s often have many children 
(sometimes up to 12). Not all of these are 
biological children, but they remain children for 
whom the couple was responsible. Caring for 
these children without the help of their spouse 
also becomes incredibly difficult, especially as 
older children’s school fees become increasingly 
expensive. Several widows lamented that they no 
longer had the money to pay for children who 
were in their final year of school and who had 
been progressing well and had been hoping to 
pass their secondary school certificate that year. 
These economic difficulties are compounded by 
the fact that funerals and funerary rituals are 
themselves very expensive. Families must pay for 
PLANNING FOR POST-EBOLA | 40  
 
the coffin and burial, but they must also provide 
food, drink and housing for all of the extended 
family and friends who arrive to mourn the 
deceased. Often, the mourning period does not 
end until one final day of celebration and feasting 
is organized, meaning that bereaved families who 
cannot afford to organize a large feast, must 
continue feeding guests while they try to gather 
the resources necessary for the feast.  
Other families explained that when they 
travelled to the ETC for treatment, or to be close 
to a sick relative, or during the extended 
mourning period, household items and domestic 
livestock had been destroyed, consumed or 
stolen by neighbors, in-laws and guests. On top of 
these costs, widow(er)s must typically pay a 
customary fine (called nongo in Lingala) to their 
in-laws when their spouse dies. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Provide school fees for children of victims 
(orphans) and of survivors, often unable to work 
because of post-Ebola syndrome, for one year.  
›› Provide widows, widowers and/or the parents of 
victims with a donation to contribute to funerary 
expenses and customary debts. 
3.1.5 EMBEZZLEMENT & UNFULFILLED 
PROMISES 
Dozens of stories circulate in Equateur about the 
embezzlement of Ebola funds. Communities 
which were not directly affected by the outbreak 
say that the epidemic was fabricated in order to 
attract the funding of big international donors. 
Those who were directly affected lament the fact 
that they ‘have not benefitted’ while national and 
regional elites and international respondents 
have made thousands of dollars through their 
participation in the response. 
Stories also circulated among both affected 
communities and international response teams 
that local administrative leaders have embezzled 
not only Ebola funds, but the material and 
equipment, such as motorbikes and electric 
generators, which (it is said) were intended for 
affected communities or rural hospitals and 
health centers. 
Several of the RECO who participated in the 
research expressed anger that their names had 
not appeared on the lists of RECO who received a 
‘bonus’ directly from the Minister of Health. 
Many pointed to corruption and nepotism on the 
part of their superiors. 
While the finger of blame is sometimes pointed 
at specific individuals in positions of power, other 
people are not as sure about who is to blame for 
the fact that the most affected communities feel 
dispossessed. For many people, the differences 
between different international actors and NGOs 
are not clear. Oftentimes, they were grouped 
together, and (as perceived representatives of 
UNICEF) so were we, with many people asking us: 
When people spoke of seeing ‘no visible impact’, 
they were referring to the vast displays of wealth 
they had witnessed with the logistics (cars, 
motorbikes, helicopters, airplanes, electric 
generators) of the response, and the fact that, 
despite still being in need (many thousands more 
people will die from malaria than Ebola in 
Equateur this year), they would no longer benefit 
from this when the response teams left. This led 
to protests when NGOs began to pull out their 
personnel and equipment to assist in Beni. 
Part of the reason for this disappointment was 
a conviction that various actors – politicians, 
national and international responders, and local 
administrators – had promised to leave this 
equipment for affected communities, or build 
hospitals, health centers and maternity clinics.  
Response teams should never make promises 
about the support which will follow an Ebola 
outbreak, unless they will be part of a program 
funded to undertake this – differences between 
humanitarian assistant and development work 
should be emphasized. 
Operational recommendations 
›› Response teams should work with national and 
regional authorities to minimize embezzlement 
and corruption as it relates to Ebola resources. 
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› Long-term investment in affected communities 
should be an integral part of response efforts, at 
least for a one-year recovery period. 
“So, you are just going to leave 
us like this?” 
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3.2 HEALTH IMPACTS 
This section outlines the impacts that EVD has on survivors’ health, including their mental health and the 
psycho-social impacts of monitoring Ebola survivors for a lingering infection which could lead them to be 
contagious to others. It also considers the mental and physical health of EVD survivors who were never 
registered and feelings of exclusion and resentment towards the response. 
3.2.1 POST-EBOLA SYNDROME 
Until the West Africa crisis, post-Ebola syndrome 
was a rumored but little-studied after-effect of 
EVD. Symptoms include joint and muscle pain, 
eye problems, including blindness, various 
neurological problems, and other ailments. 
Most of the survivors who participated in the 
research alluded to continuous ill health, physical 
pain and in some cases, neurological conditions 
such as confusion and forgetfulness, and mental 
health problems connected to trauma. Several 
people spoke of conditions (pain and weakness) 
so severe that they were still unable to work. 
ALIMA is currently following all survivors in 
order to monitor this syndrome, and is also 
treating certain conditions, such as the eye 
problems. While an earlier report suggested that, 
towards the end of the epidemic (early July 2018), 
this monitoring was burdensome on survivors 
because it was extensive and almost daily,37 
during our interviews (September 2018), 
survivors had undergone some time without 
surveillance, and were eager for the check-ups 
and treatment to begin again. They were 
particularly concerned with finding treatment for 
their joint pain. Where these visits had caused 
them to feel some shame before, they were now 
welcomed as a continuation of care. 
It is important to follow EVD survivors in order 
to determine the varied symptoms following EVD 
infection and to determine the best care. 
However, a delicate balance must be struck 
between continuing the care of EVD survivors and 
burdening their time with too many tests and 
check-ups. 
3.2.2 MENTAL HEALTH 
Mental health is a very important issue in rural 
Congo, even as it is almost completely neglected 
by national biomedical structures. Following an 
Ebola epidemic, mental health issues arise from 
                                                          
37 Duda (2018).  
38 IASC (2008; 2015).  
the trauma of the disease, from the trauma of 
losing family members, and from the social 
stigmatization experienced by many EVD 
survivors. 
Mental health requires a ‘whole of society’ 
approach, and psychological support should be 
accompanied by communication which reduce 
stigma in the broader community.38 Families of 
victims, especially widows and orphaned children, 
are also in need of continued psycho-social 
support. If resources permit, women should have 
the possibility of talking to female psychologists.  
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› After the epidemic, survivors should be 
supported by the creation of community support 
groups, which can be established in collaboration 
with ANVE. 
3.2.3 SEXUAL TRANSMISSION OF EBOLA 
Viral traces of Ebola have been found to persist in 
semen, vaginal secretions and breastmilk after a 
patient recovers and no longer has any detectable 
virus in other bodily fluids.39 In West Africa, there 
have been cases of the sexual transmission of 
Ebola, and of the transmission from mother to 
breastfeeding infant. 
One important part of ALIMA’s post-Ebola 
check-ups, is to monitor the virus in the body 
fluids of survivors. However, the possibility of 
remaining contagious is one of the sources of 
stigmatization against which survivors must 
struggle, and so the ALIMA teams must make sure 
that these investigations do not jeopardize the 
social standing of their patients.  
There are also challenges in getting survivors to 
use condoms during sexual intercourse, as 
condoms are often associated with disease or 
with a socially unacceptable level of sexual 
promiscuity.  
39 Sissoko et al (2017).  
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EVD survivors have emphasized the need for 
those conducting tests on body fluids to be non-
local staff, to assure that their confidentiality is 
protected. In order to minimize the stigma which 
could be attached to such tests, they should be 
conducted as part of a comprehensive check-up. 
Efforts should be made to minimize alarm in the 
community, while providing survivors with the 
information necessary to protect themselves and 
others. 
Operational recommendation 
›› In order to destigmatize the use of condoms and 
encourage EVD survivors to use them, village-wide 
regional campaigns should be undertaken to 
encourage their use.  
3.2.4 UNREGISTERED PATIENTS 
Following the epidemic, some health actors have 
felt overwhelmed and frustrated by the number 
of unregistered patients who have subsequently 
claimed to have had Ebola. 
Many of the health actors who participated in 
the research attributed this to the support EVD 
survivors and families of victims have received 
during and following the epidemic. They claim 
that those who may have had Ebola, but who fled 
the response out of fear (and perhaps even some 
people who were sick but did not have Ebola) are 
now making claims so that they too may benefit 
from this support. 
This is a challenging ethical question with no 
easy answer: What to do with those people who 
were sick, but were too afraid to collaborate with 
the Ebola response teams during the outbreak? 
Do they deserve the same level of care as other 
patients who passed through the ETCs? Or should 
they receive no care in order to encourage people 
to collaborate with the system if they wish to 
benefit from it? 
This question becomes all the more pressing 
when one considers the EVD survivors and 
families of victims who were affected at the onset 
of the epidemic when the response had not yet 
arrived. As a family member of the first confirmed 
case of Ebola, in Ikoko Impenge village, told us, 
referring to international response team 
personnel: 
 
  
“We were the first to fall sick, 
and yet we have not benefitted 
from your presence.” 
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3.3 SOCIAL IMPACTS 
This section outlines the enduring social repercussions of the Ebola epidemic, and draws attention to 
organizations, such as the National Association of Ebola Vanquishers (ANVE), which can be collaborated with 
and supported in order to aid both survivors and their broader communities.   
3.3.1 STIGMA 
Stigma is multifaceted and has had an impact on 
many different people; from local healers or 
Batwa who were thought to be at the origin of the 
Ebola ‘curse’, to survivors, families of victims, and 
local health actors, who, in some cases, continue 
to be referred to as ‘contaminated.’  
For the latter, this is often expressed through 
avoidance and rejection, with several health 
workers and survivors telling us that they have 
been unable to visit family members, who refuse 
to offer them food and housing. It is also 
experienced in the form of mockery and jeering.  
People often fear direct contact, although they 
may also refuse to eat food cooked by a survivor, 
or to touch goods or money handled by a survivor. 
This fear may be particularly acute because of the 
ongoing follow-up exams, which seek to monitor 
the presence of the virus in survivors’ body fluids.  
Many RECO and doctors have experienced a 
rejection by some members of society, initially 
because they were rumored to be collaborating 
with a project to infect people with Ebola for 
financial gain, and subsequently because of the 
large amounts of money they are said to have 
made by participating in the coordination.  
On the other hand, some rural health actors 
have found themselves mocked for having lost so 
much money during the epidemic, and for being 
unable to afford their children’s school fees. See 
also, 2.3.4: Free health care.  
Discrimination of survivors and the families of 
victims is ongoing and should continuously be 
addressed by the response, including in the 
months following the end of the epidemic.40   
Celebrations organized when survivors leave 
ETCs, in which broader communities can 
participate, and are reassured that it is safe to 
interact with survivors, are an excellent way of 
reintegrating survivors. 
 
                                                          
40 ERAP (2014); Arwady et al (2014).  
 
Capacity-building recommendations 
›› Stigmatization of survivors can be minimized by 
donating sewing machines, bicycle repair kits to 
ANVE, so that survivors can play a more important 
role in the community. 
›› ANVE should be supported in the establishment 
of support groups for those directly affected by the 
epidemic, so that it can reach out to more isolated 
families and survivors, who do not live in proximity 
to its base in Itipo.  
›› ANVE should also be supported in reaching out 
to other survivor groups in West Africa, in creating 
a national network in DRC and in applying for funds 
for its own projects. 
3.3.2 TORN SOCIAL FABRIC 
Fear of contagion led many people to stop 
shaking hands, to distance themselves physically 
from others, to stop visiting others and to limit 
their attendance at funerals. This fear and lack of 
trust continues to erode relationships and to 
make people feel afraid and isolated. 
Many people describe the epidemic as akin to 
‘war’. They are referring to the chaos, the fear, 
the ways in which they had to mobilize all their 
resources in the fight to stop the disease, and in 
the losses they suffered. 
Several people told us that their pain would be 
ease if a hospital, a maternity ward, a school, or 
another symbolic building could be constructed 
or refurbished in order to mark this momentous 
event and honor those whose lives were lost.  
Capacity-building recommendation 
›› A ‘whole society’ approach should be used to 
develop plans with affected communities for 
appropriate memorialization of the epidemic, its 
victims and the sacrifices and losses of affected 
communities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Evaluating epidemic responses is crucial to improving response strategy for future epidemics. For 
example, it is widely held that the 2014-16 Ebola outbreak in West Africa spiraled out of control because 
national and international responses did not draw on lessons learned from previous epidemics, such as 
the work of anthropologists Epelboin and the Hewletts.41 These evaluations had emphasized the 
importance of community engagement and the problems associated with opaque isolation units and 
treatments, and the rumors surrounding foreign medical personnel and their protective equipment – 
but these mistakes were repeated in West Africa.  
DR Congo’s Ministry of Public Health and National Biomedical Institut (INRB) house many experts who 
are veterans of Ebola epidemics, such as Jean-Jacques Muyembe, the Congolese epidemiologist, who 
has investigated all ten of DR Congo’s epidemics since 1976. Building on the insights of previous 
anthropologists, the advice offered by Professor Muyembe during a meeting with the author in 2017, 
and ongoing research with communities affected by DR Congo’s 7th Ebola epidemic (2014) in another 
equatorial region,42 this report is based on recommendations made by various local actors (health 
officials and community health workers, government officials and administrators, community leaders, 
Ebola survivors and their families, and the families of victims) affected by DR Congo’s 9th Ebola epidemic. 
Building on these recommendations, this report proposes a Grassroots Model for Epidemic Response. 
The Grassroots Model for Epidemic Response has four key principles. The first is a ‘whole society’ 
approach that attends not only to those individuals directly affected by the outbreak, but also to their 
broader communities. Doing so can minimize fear, stigmatization and resentment, and help to rebuild 
social fabrics fragilized during the epidemic.  
The second is a commitment to inclusivity which appreciates that ‘communities’ are not homogenous 
and prioritizes the engagement of marginalized and vulnerable populations. This includes an attention 
to gender, to inter-generational dynamics, to ethnic, religious or caste minorities, and to vulnerable 
populations such as widow(er)s, pregnant women, the infirm and the elderly.  
The third is that attention to local stakes can help responders appreciate why Ebola epidemics are 
understood through the lens of broader issues such as politics, economics and religion. Previously 
classed as ‘rumors’, these alternative explanations are often very revealing about perceptions of the 
state and health system, and about social tensions. Attending to these dynamics is of the utmost 
importance for a successful epidemic response.  
Finally, a commitment to utilizing pre-existing epidemic response capacity ensures that interventions 
build on the social and cultural resources of the communities they seek to support. This report has 
presented the local capacities of the health system in detail (see: 2.1.3 Community health workers) and 
has demonstrated that their integration from the very start of the epidemic is integral to an effective 
and coordinated response. 
The overall finding of the report is that an Ebola epidemic, along with the way the response itself is 
conducted, can have significant social, psychological, economic, and health impacts for the 
communities involved. By providing a close, qualitative reportage on perceptions of the epidemic and 
the response in Equateur Province, the report aims to render tangible the social, political and economic 
                                                          
41 Hewlett & Amola 2003; Hewlett & Hewlett 2008; Hewlett 2016; Epelboin & Formenty 2011; Epelboin, Odugleh-Kolev et al. 2014. 
42 Alcayna-Stevens & Giles-Vernick (forthcoming); Alcayna-Stevens (forthcoming). 
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dimensions of an Ebola epidemic and to offer recommendations for the response which prepare 
communities for life ‘post-Ebola’ at each stage of an intervention.  
Epidemic management focuses on what needs to be done before, during and after an epidemic. Each 
section of the report examines one of these temporal stages. During ‘preparedness’, the focus is on 
reducing vulnerability to disaster and strengthening capacity, surveillance and early detection. 
‘Response’ begins with a coordinated and rapid investigation, and then the implementation of 
appropriate control and case management, which is supported at each step and in every aspect by 
robust, clear and two-way communication. Finally, ‘recovery’ focuses on evaluation and accompanies 
affected communities in their lives ‘post-Ebola.’ Each stage should seek to minimise the health, social 
and economic impacts of the epidemic. 
But as this report demonstrates, the DRC’s 9th Ebola epidemic was a watershed moment in Ebola 
epidemic response. Response teams have learned from the past, and increasingly prioritize national 
leadership and local community engagement, partnership with trusted leaders, dignified burials, and 
improvements in patient care. The deployment of an experimental vaccine provided a new tool for 
response teams to break the chain of transmission. The Biosecure Emergency Care Units (CUBE) 
deployed by the NGO, ALIMA provided new treatment options for case management, and were 
described as ‘paradise-like’ by several participants in this research. Building on these improvements, 
this report has provided a wide range of recommendations, drawn from discussions with local actors, 
which can further strengthen future Ebola epidemic responses. 
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